



Final Evaluation of the
Second National Development
Plan (NDP II)
(2014/2015 - 2019/2020)

The Institutional
Framework Analysis
Thematic Area

FINAL DRAFT AUGUST 2022

Prepared by



For the National Planning Authority

CONTENTS

Table of Contents

ACRONYMS	III
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
PART I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY	8
1.1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT.....	9
1.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE NDP II FINAL EVALUATION	11
1.3. METHODOLOGY FOR NDPII EVALUATION.....	11
1.3.1 Focus of NDPII evaluation.....	11
1.4. ADOPTION OF OECD-DAC EVALUATION CRITERIA.....	12
1.5. SCOPE OF THE NDP II EVALUATION	13
1.6. ORGANISATION OF THE REPORT.....	14
PART II: OVERVIEW OF THE SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN.....	14
2.1. IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK FOR NDP II.....	14
2.2. NDP 2 OVERSIGHT INSTITUTIONS	16
2.2. NDP II MONITORING AND EVALUATION FORUMS.....	18
PART III: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF NDP II MIDDLE TERM REVIEW	19
3.1. FINDINGS OF NDP II MIDDLE TERM REVIEW	19
3.2. NDP II MTR RECOMMENDATIONS	20
PART IV: NDP2 INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE TOWARDS ACHIEVEMENT OF NDP2 OBJECTIVES ...	23
4.1 INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND NON-STATE ACTORS	24
4.2. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (LG)	25
4.3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR AGRICULTURE.....	28
4.4 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR TOURISM	33
4.5. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MINERALS, OIL AND GAS.....	35
4.6 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT	36
4.7 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT	38
4.8. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ICT INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT	40
4.9. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATER-FOR-PRODUCTION INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT	41
4.10. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACCESS TO HEALTH	45
4.11. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACCESS TO EDUCATION.....	47
4.12. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SKILLS DEVELOPMENT.....	51
4.13. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.....	54
4.14 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATER (AND SANITATION) AND ENVIRONMENT	56
4.15 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.....	60
4.16 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILITY SECTOR.....	61
4.17 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF JUSTICE LAW AND ORDER SECTOR	63
PART IV: KEY INSTITUTIONAL PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES	67
5.1. DESIGN OF THE NDP	67
5.2. PROJECT DESIGN AND PIP ISSUES.....	67
5.3 PLANNING AND BUDGETING	68
5.4 IMPLEMENTATION	68
5.6 MONITORING AND EVALUATION.....	68
5.7. OVERSIGHT.....	69

PART VI: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	69
6.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	69
6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS	74
BIBLIOGRAPHY LIST OF REFERENCES	77
ANNEXES	78
ANNEX 1: SUMMARY OF THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NDP II IMPLEMENTATION, MANDE INSTITUTIONS	78
REFERENCES	ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
APPENDIX.....	ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

ACRONYMS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ASWA	Agricultural Sector Working Group
BFP	Budget Framework Paper
BTVET	Business, Technical and Vocational Energy and Training
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
CASSOA	Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency
CDO	Cotton Development Organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DIT	Directorate of Industrial Training
DP	Development Partner
DLB	District Land Board
DSC	District Service Commission
EAC	East African Community
ECD	Early Childhood Development
EMSDP	Energy and Minerals Sector Development Plan
EPRC	Economic Policy Research Centre
ERA	Electricity Regulatory Authority
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GWP	Government White Paper
HCD	Human Capital Development
HE	Higher Education
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IWP	Inland Water Port
JLOS	Justice, Law and Order Sector
LC	Local Council
LG	Local Government
LMIS	Labour Market Information System
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries
MDA	Ministry, Department and/ or Agency
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEMD	Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MoGLSD	Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development
MICT	Ministry of ICT
MoES	Ministry of Education and Sports
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MoPS	Ministry of Public Service
MoWT	Ministry of Works and Transport
MPS	Ministerial Policy Statement
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MTR	Medium Term Review
MoTWA	Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities

MW	Mega Watt
MWE	Ministry of Water and Environment
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Service
NAR	National Agricultural Research
NARI	National Agricultural Research Institute
NARO	National Agricultural Research Organisation
NCHE	National Council for Higher Education
NDP	National Development Plan
NDP1 or NDPI	First National Development Plan
NDP2 or NDPII	Second National Development Plan
NDP3 or NDPIII	Third National Development Plan
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
NFA	National Forestry Authority
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NPA	National Planning Authority
NPPSME	National Policy on Public Sector Monitoring and Evaluation
NWSC	National Water and Sewerage Corporation
OAG	Office of the Auditor General
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PO	President's Office
PS	Permanent Secretary
PSD	Private Sector Development
PSFU	Private Sector Foundation Uganda
RE	Renewable Energy
REA	Rural Electrification Agency
REB	Rural Electrification Board
RED	Renewable Energy Department
SGR	Standard Gauge Railway
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach [to Planning]
SWG	Sector Working Group
TWG	Technical Working Group
UBTS	Uganda Blood Transfusion Service
UCC	Uganda Communications Commission
UEB	Uganda Electricity Board
UEDCL	Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited
UEGCL	Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited
UETCL	Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited
UNMA	Uganda National Meteorological Authority
UNRA	Uganda National Roads Authority
UPE	Universal Primary Education
URC	Uganda Railways Corporation
USD	United States Dollar
USE	Universal Secondary Education
UTB	Uganda Tourism Board
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority
UWEC	Uganda Wildlife Education Centre
ZARDI	Zonal Agricultural Research and Development Institute

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Institutional Framework Thematic Area Report is part of the terminal evaluation report of the second National Development Plan (NDPII). The institutional framework terminal evaluation assessed the robustness of the institutional framework in supporting the implementation of the NDPII in a coordinated, cohesive and integrated manner. The terminal institutional framework evaluation assessed among others: the structure, roles, functions and mandates of key implementing institutions, the oversight and management architecture for implementation, monitoring and evaluating of NDP progress and extent to which the proposed institutional reforms were effected. The institutional framework was examined using both secondary and primary methods of data collection which included: desk documentary reviews and interviews of key informants in a number of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), Local Governments (LGs) and non-state actors.

The institutional frameworks for the implementation of the NDP II were within the existing executive, judiciary and legislature set up of Uganda. The systemic and institutional reforms that were proposed to improve the implementation of the NDP II were based on the lessons learnt from the implementation of NDP1. The implementation, monitoring and evaluation reforms that were suggested to enhance the political ownership and leadership as well as limit the technical leadership challenges faced during the implementation of the NDP I were not fully implemented.

The NDP II was therefore exposed to similar systemic and institutional challenges experienced during the NDP I period. Analogously, the rationalization of MDAs which had been anticipated to improve public management efficiency and effectiveness during NDP 2 was not decisively implemented due to the slow good will of Government leaving the public system exposed to inherit challenges of overlapping and in some cases conflicting mandates which resulted in wastage and made coordination by oversight agencies ineffective.

Major Findings

The major findings of the institutional framework terminal evaluation were highlighted as follows:

The institutional framework reforms expected to improve the political ownership and leadership as well as the technical capacity to ensure seamless implementation of the NDP 2 were not fully executed. Cabinet had not yet put in place a standing committee to handle NDP implementation matters. Relatedly, there was no committee of Parliament dedicated to National Development Planning. It was therefore not enough to prescribe structures, define their roles and or responsibilities even in the ideal situation of no overlaps or duplication of roles and responsibilities without ensuring that measures and or requisite legal frameworks were put in place to ensure their operationalization and optimal functionality. The technical staff at Parliament were emphatic to the effect that re-configuration of Parliamentary Committees required amendment of the laws that prescribed the functioning of Parliament.

The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) coordinated and implemented government policies across MDAs and sectors. During the NDP II period, a Delivery Unit was established to strengthen the

coordination function of the OPM. The Delivery Unit had an elaborate structure and its head was equivalent to a Cabinet Minister. It had a technical Deputy Head (equivalent to an Assistant Commissioner) who supervised seven thematic area¹ team leaders (equivalent to a Principal Officer). The Delivery Unit was, however, understaffed (50%), insufficiently facilitated and not all staff had been trained in delivery of government programs hence curtailing its optimal functionality.

The lead agencies coordinating the Sector Working Groups were not effective due to lack of full time secretariats (they were mainly housed in planning departments of MDAs), inadequate technical capacity and under staffing, poor attendance by representatives of member institutions, which delayed decision making and the high affinity of public agencies to work in silos since funds were still sent to MDA votes.

Public institutions dominated the implementation of the NDP II. The participation of the private sector across MDAs and sectors was minimal yet Uganda pursued a private sector-led economy. Civil society continued to play its role as a watchdog over government and private sector performance. The participation of the private sector (and or CSOs) in procurement, contract negotiation, capacity building, technical evaluation of works and engaging the design agenda for the soft policy issues like disability responsive infrastructure and services remained minimal during the NDP 2 period.

Despite the existence of well elaborated and intentioned M & E structures, the monitoring and evaluation of the NDP II was biased towards public sector dominance that had very weak mechanisms to induce the private sector, NGOs and other non-state actors to monitor and evaluate Government policies, programmes and plans. The Civil Society Organizations remained reliant on donor funding which was not sustainable. The media continued to be a key player in development through promotion of civic awareness among the public that resulted in greater demand for information.

The reforms in NDP institutional monitoring and evaluation functions hinged on the Annual Review Forum, Sector Review Forum, Private Sector and Civil Society Forum and Local Government Review Forum were not operationalized. The forums would have provided platforms for stakeholder participation and collective action. The failure to undertake regular stakeholder reviews as had been intended under the proposed annual review forums, sector reviews, private sector and civil society reviews as well as local government reviews was a lost chance for such forums to improve the monitoring and evaluation processes of the NDP II that would have further popularised the Government interventions towards attainment of middle income status among the different stakeholders.

Under the NDP 2 period, the Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) only concentrated on Sub-County Barazas and ignored the Parish Barazas!. The NDPII Parish Barazas based on initiatives in the office of the Prime Minister to promote downward accountability were not regular. The non-functionality of Parish Barazas exposed a perilous institutional failure that undermined the participation of citizens and communities in the development process and provision of a platform for

¹ Education, Health, Infrastructure, Jobs and Income, Data and Policy Research, Agriculture, Finance

demanding social accountability. Public awareness through Parish Barazas proposed under NDP II was a missed opportunity for the communities to monitor and evaluate Government programmes and projects implemented in their areas.

Across sectors and or MDAs inadequate funding was the “financial cancer” irrespective of their categorisation as either “super MDAs (MoLG and LGs, OAG), centrality (OPM, MoFPED, NPA) and or coordination/oversight responsibilities (OP, OPM). In addition to underfunding, Sector Working Groups (SWGs) and or Coordination Secretariats at line ministries struggled to overcome constraints such as limited capacity for coordination and or the lack of shared objectives to drive a sector approach and hence their high affinity to operate in silos.

Accounting Officers at Local Governments and Urban authorities asserted that LGs and Urban Authorities were inadequately funded to deliver adequate and quality decentralised services. There were also undertones of increased re-centralisation of authority by the Government that undermined the principles and values of decentralisation. The re-centralisation was in relation to: (i) Appointment of Accounting Officers, (ii) Local Revenue Management (Public Finance Management Act, 2005), local revenue was remitted to the Single Treasury Account and (iii) the National Building Planning Board limited the powers of LGs in physical planning since it could overturn or alter LGs decisions.

Government flagged irrigation infrastructure as one of its major interventions during the NDP 2. Irrigated land produced 40% of global food (IFAD, 2015). Uganda had one the highest irrigation potentials in the world with over 15% (37,000 sq. km out of the total area of 241,559 sq. km) of her surface area covered by fresh water resources. Uganda’s ratio of cultivated area under irrigation to the irrigation potential was only 0.5% compared to 3.6% for Tanzania, 2.0% for Kenya and 1.6% for Burundi. There was a lack of streamlined extension structures to coordinate and provide advisory services and technical backstopping on irrigation to farmers from the local level to the national level. Irrigation did not make economic sense to most farmers because of low returns from farming. In addition, to physical water scarcity in times of need, in other areas farmers could not abstract the water and deliver it to their farms because of the high operation costs of conventional pumps that relied on fuel and or electricity. The land tenure systems in Uganda, especially customary tenure, was not clearly defined and it deterred farmers from making long-term investments on land (Wanyama et al, 2017).

The Education Act (2008) classified pre-school as a largely private undertaking which limited its access due to the relatively high fees and uneven distribution of Early Childhood Development (ECD) centres that was skewed towards urban areas or wealthy communities and central Uganda yet the earliest years of life provided children with the opportunity to grow to their full potential. All obstacles to the institutionalisation of ECD needed to be addressed to ensure equitable access to ECD.

During the FY 2019/20, in an attempt to increase access to higher education, the Higher Students Financing Board (HESFB) provided loans to 6,443 students for first and second semesters in various HEIs bringing the cumulative number of beneficiaries to 10,041 since the Board started its mandated activities. The lack of the standard unit cost for programmes across universities made it difficult for HESFB to make financial projections since the Board capped any loan to maximum of Ugx 7m per academic year. Relatedly, the HESFB did not fund higher degrees such as masters and doctorates.

In terms of human capital development for the tourism sub-sector, during the FY 2019/20 tourist and wildlife training institutes performed as follows: (i) 164 students (57% female) enrolled at Uganda Hotel and Tourism Training Institute (UHTTI), Jinja and 228 (69% females) graduated and (ii) 162 (68 female) students enrolled at Uganda Wildlife Research and Training Institute (UWRTI), Kasese, and 72 graduated with Diplomas and Certificates. The enrolment and graduation figures were indicative of the low capacity of the institutes to produce the required human resources amidst undertones of being poorly equipped. The dominance of females in both the training institutes and the employment domain was implied. There were also undertones that foreigners at managerial levels dominated the hotel and tourism sub-sectors. A number of universities, however, offered a Bachelors of Tourism and Hotel Management, which provided room for academic progression and was a source for teaching and management staff for the sub-sectors.

The oil and gas legal regime in Uganda was weak compared to other countries like Liberia or Egypt, where all international agreements or investment contracts were effected only after parliamentary approval and or ratification. The Minister of Energy and Mineral Development negotiated and entered into petroleum agreements (Section 9 of the Upstream Act and Section 8 of the Midstream Act) and did not require parliamentary approval. There was no oversight role of Parliament during the negotiation and contracting process despite the existence of a National Resources Committee of Parliament.

Road transport was the most dominant mode carrying 96.5 % and 95 % of freight cargo and passenger traffic, respectively. As at 2019, the Country had a total road network of 159,364 km, which comprised of 20,854 km of National Roads; 38,603 km of District Roads; 19,959km of Urban Roads and 79,947 km of Community Access Roads. Overall, only 6,107km (3.83%) were paved and for district roads only 106.5 km (0.28%) were paved while for urban roads, 1229.7 km (6.16%) were paved. Development Partners investment and support was biased towards the construction area while the Railway, Water and Air transport sub-sectors were inadequately funded yet a Multi Model transport approach was the preferred model where all areas would be developed simultaneously. There was marvelous road development but less maintenance primarily funded by Government. The Development Partners continued to be concerned that long-standing policy issues such as adequate resources for road maintenance, progress on axle load controls and improved inter-modal transport planning that were continuously raised at annual review meetings had not been given due attention by the Government.

The success and coherence of the Health Policy Advisory Committee (HPAC) (SWG of the Health Sector) was attributed to the homogeneity of the sector and consistent support from the development partners. The effectiveness of the HPAC was demonstrated through efficiency in control of cross-border communicable diseases as well as epidemics such as Covid-19, Ebola and Marburg outbreaks. The institutional setup of the highhanded health-monitoring unit under State House, however, remained unclear within Government since the unit indulged in functions similar to those of the Quality Assurance Department within the Ministry of Health. In addition, the LGs found it difficult to attract medical doctors to far and hard to reach districts/areas. Amidst undertones against recentralisation of formerly decentralized services, it would be a noble decision to recentralise the

appointment of District Medical Officers (DMOs). Relatedly, the proliferation of LGs across the country constrained the role of inspection, monitoring and support supervision.

Relatedly, during the FY 2019/20, the health sector made significant strides towards achievement of key outcome indicators. Seventy seven percent of sub-counties had functional health centre III against the targeted 81%, immunization for the third dose for Diphtheria, Pertussis (Whooping Cough) and Tetanus (DPT) was 91% against the targeted 97%. Couple years of protection performed at 65% of the target of 4,700,000. However, a total of 57 HCIVs provided Caesarean Section (C/S) services without blood transfusion services!

Trafficking in persons and poor welfare of migrant workers was a recurrent challenge for the social development sector. Some migrant workers often used informal channels to access employment abroad but sought Government interventions whenever they faced challenges. There were undertones that MoGLSD had not been decisive in handling the issue of labour migrants and due attention was required given the high youth and graduate-youth unemployment levels in Uganda. It was believed that poor implementation and compliance with the 2017 bilateral agreements with countries like Saudi Arabia that hosted more than 140, 000 Ugandan migrant workers who annually remitted about USD 900m to Uganda needed due attention. Relatedly, the labour structures of the LGs were not all filled and majority of the labour officers in the LGs were by assignment, which compromised the delivery of labour services in the LGs.

Public Administration was mandated to determine remuneration, public information management and sharing as well as results-based management (efficiency) of MDAs. The payment of a living wage started with Permanent Secretaries but had not been cascaded pro-rata resulting in discriminatory remunerations across sectors and worse still within the similar categories or functions like teaching at primary and secondary school levels. The failure by Government to curtail Members of Parliament from determining their remuneration and allowances remained a sticky matter during the NDP 2 period. Empirics were, however, not in line with the allegation that low remunerations across MDAs and LGs was a catalyst to corruption.

Proper use of public funds generally improved as evidenced by the substantial reduction in qualified opinions by the Auditor General. Of the 453 financial audits concluded by the Office of the Auditor General during the FY 2018/19, 420 (93%) entities had unqualified opinions while only 33 (7%) entities had qualified opinions.

The divergences between appropriation by Parliament and final allocation by MoFPED was attributed to either to weaknesses in budget processes or frequent ad-hoc supplementary budget requests. Although it was argued that the budget supplementary requests were legal and were in line with the provisions of the PMFA, 2015, they signalled to either poor planning or failure to accord due attention to the budgeting process. The terminal evaluation shared the displeasure of other stakeholders towards the institutionalised budget supplementary requests since they eroded the credibility of the budget and that of the institutions mandated to execute it over the NDP II period. Supplementary budgets led to cuts in sector budgets, which negatively affected achievement of targets or fiscal deficit financing through domestic borrowing and printing as well as issuance of currency not backed by production.

With regard Justice Law and Order Sector, the wave of kidnaps and high profile murders during the FY 2018/19 needed thorough investigation. The average time taken to dispose cases reduced from 1,095 days to 810 days though it was more than the targeted 720 days. It was not clear whether that also applied to land cases or disputes. In addition, there were complaints about lost files and overstay in police cells and the sector struggled to mainstream the National Policy on Zero Tolerance to Corruption. The Uganda Police Force was consistent in all IG corruption perception surveys as one of the most corrupt institutions. Analogously, there was a tendency of institutionalized crime as manifested in increasing number of police officers that were in court for committing heinous crimes.

Coordination of the NDP II was a complex challenge that was complicated by numerous off-budget resources and funds channelled through numerous development partners and the fragmentation of Ministries into 157 specialised autonomous and semi-autonomous authorities. For instance under the agricultural sector, NARO alone had 116 off-budget projects worth Ugx 41.173bn during the FY 2019/20. Coordination was therefore essential to ensure that the best use was made of the limited resources by bringing together the various agencies in the sector to tackle major development challenges faced by the Country. Relatedly, the Technical Implementation Coordination Committee (TICC) under OPM that should have played a major role in identifying and raising crosscutting constraints that affected performance of sectors for consideration by higher level policy makers was too large (included all Permanent Secretaries) to be effective. Analogously, few sectors or subsectors established mechanisms for regular external reviews that could have provided independent checks on the progress of sector.

Major Recommendations

Based on the major findings a number of recommendations were made. The implementation and M & E institutional frameworks became more complex as the NDPs progressed in numbers (NDP I, DNP II and or NDP III). Before additional implementation and M&E structures were suggested for subsequent NDPs deliberate efforts be directed towards addressing challenges that hindered the seamless functionality of the previous suggested structures to avoid over prescription. Specifically:

- a) The reforms in NDP institutional monitoring and evaluation functions hinged on the Annual Review Forum, Private Sector and Civil Society Forum as well as the Local Government Review Forum should be operationalized to enable seamless implementation, monitoring and evaluation of subsequent national development plans.
- b) Under the NDP 2 period, the Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) only concentrated on Sub-County Barazas and ignored the Parish Barazas!. The non-functionality of Parish Barazas exposed a perilous institutional failure that undermined the participation of citizens and communities in the development process and provision of a platform for demanding social accountability. It was recommended that both the Sub-County and Parish Barazas should be fully operationalized to serve their intended purposes for subsequent national development plans.

- c) The Delivery Unit under the OPM should be adequately funded, staffed and facilitated to function optimally and execute its coordination mandates for subsequent national development plans.

In terms of positioning NPA to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness, the MTR recommended to the effect that by placing NPA under direct supervision of the Presidency, NPA could gain a stronger clout over other MDAs and strategically provide technical capacity to cabinet on matters related to national development. The terminal evaluation did not find any major problem with the current reporting mechanism and recommended that the status quo be maintained but NPA should be adequately funded and staffed to optimally to execute its planning mandate.

Local Governments were tasked to deliver adequate and quality decentralised services because they were closer to the end users of development. The LGs had both technical staffing gaps as well as capacity issues that required urgent attention for them to fulfil their mandates in relation to delivering the NDP objectives. It was recommended that the MoLG and LGs should be funded adequately and capacity gaps bridged to enable LGs effectively and efficiently deliver their mandates under a strengthened decentralisation arrangement.

There were undertones (LG Stakeholders) that the MoLG had not strongly played its role of advocacy for the decentralisation principles and left it to the LG associations, which had to do it through the line Ministry. Relatedly, the LG Finance Commission, whose mandate was to advocate for finance of LGs, was unfortunately unfunded and could not optimally function. It was therefore recommended that the MoLG and its associated structures should purposely and decisively advocate for a strengthened decentralised mandate to achieve the noble objectives of decentralisation.

The Education Act (2008) classified pre-school as a largely private undertaking which limited its access due to the relatively high fees and uneven distribution of Early Childhood Development (ECD) centres that was skewed towards urban areas or wealthy communities and central Uganda yet the earliest years of life provided children with the opportunity to grow to their full potential. The Government should amend the relevant laws and institutionalize the provision of ECD to ensure equitable provision and enable children grow to their full potential.

During the FY 2019/20, in an attempt to increase access to higher education, the Higher Students Financing Board (HESFB) provided loans to 6,443 students for first and second semesters in various HEIs bringing the cumulative number of undergraduate beneficiaries to 10,041 but the board never funded graduate studies. The lack of the standard unit cost for programmes across universities made it difficult for HESFB to make financial projections since the Board capped any loan to maximum of Ugx 7m per academic year. It was recommended that capping be based on the highest scholarship year across programmes and beneficiary higher education institutions to easy financial projections since payment was based on actuals. Relatedly, HESFB should seriously consider funding graduate studies and target universities with weak staff development schemes to improve the quality of staff at such universities.

Road transport was the most dominant mode carrying 96.5 % and 95 % of freight cargo and passenger traffic, respectively. The Government should increase the annual budget provisions for road

maintenance to counter damages often caused by prolonged torrential rains and clear the ever increasing maintenance backlog as well as increase the mechanical imprest to match the maintenance needs for both national and district roads.

The terminal evaluation of the NDP II noted that the major institutional framework challenge of water for production was that the National Irrigation Policy, 2017 was silent about informal irrigation practices and made no provisions for its regulation. It was therefore necessary to find mechanisms of regulating informal irrigation as opposed to the blanket suspension of agricultural activities from wetlands.

The divergences between appropriation by Parliament and final allocation by MoFPED was attributed to the institutionalised budget supplementary requests that eroded the credibility of the budget and institutions mandated to execute it over the NDP II period. The terminal evaluation recommended that there was need for fiscal discipline since supplementary budgets led to cuts in sector budgets, which negatively affected achievement of sector targets.

PART I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

1.1. Background and Context

1. In 2015, Uganda launched her second five-year (2015/16-2019/20) National Development Plan (NDP2). The overall goal of the second national development plan was to propel Uganda into a middle-income status by 2020 with a per capita income of USD 1,033. The middle-income status was to be achieved through strengthening the country's competitiveness for sustainable wealth creation, employment and inclusive growth. To strengthen the country's competitiveness, four objectives had to be attained during the implementation period of the NDP II: (i) increasing sustainable production, productivity and value addition in key growth opportunities; (ii) increasing the stock and quality of strategic infrastructure to accelerate the country's competitiveness; (iii) enhancing human capital development and (iv) strengthening mechanisms for quality, effective and efficient service delivery.

2. The four objectives were to be achieved through a number of development strategies: (i) ensuring macro-economic stability with fiscal expansion for frontloading infrastructure investments; (ii) industrialization and export oriented growth through value addition, agro processing, mineral beneficiation, selected heavy and light manufacturing; (iii) an employment creation strategy through fast tracking skills development and harnessing the demographic dividend; (iv) strong Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) for sustainable development; (v) a private sector led growth and a quasi-market approach and (vi) strengthening governance mechanisms and structures(NDP 2, 2015).

3. The formulation of the NDPII was informed by the achievements, challenges encountered and lessons learnt during the implementation of the NDP I. One of the major concerns with the performance of the NDP I was the failure to align sector and Ministries, Department and Agencies (MDAs) plans as well as the budgets with priorities identified in the National Development Plan. Relatedly, there were weak engagements with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the private sector organisations in the implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) processes. In addition, there were weakness in the public sector management that included low levels of enforcement of reforms, corruption (both perceived and real), procurement problems, conflicting mandates, low productivity and low (or discriminatory) remunerations.

4. The NDP II therefore aimed to overcome the above challenges through strengthening Sector Wide Approaches (SWaps) as well as more effective monitoring of results by Sector Working Groups (SWGs). The National Planning Authority (NPA) therefore issued Sector Development Planning (SDP) guidelines in April, 2016, aimed to ensure alignment of Sector Development Plans (SDP) with the NDP, with a standard format and timeframe. It was, however, noted that not all sectors had complaint plans and worse still some sectors had none during the NDP II period. Other sectors like transport and water produced longer-term strategies and targets which were appropriate for guiding large-scale investment programmes with longer planning horizons.

5. The NDP II was based on sectors and implemented through SWGs which were a structure under the SWaps. The SWaps were adopted to address the growing dissatisfaction with the traditional project approaches that were deemed 'fragmented, donor-driven' interventions entailing high transaction

costs for aid recipient countries. The SWaP aimed to strengthen alignment of sectors through an agreed upon single strategic plan whose progress would be formally reviewed on an annual basis.

5. Most Development Partners supported SWaps to overcome the narrow objectives of projects and aimed at broadening Government and national ownership over public sector policy and resource allocation decisions within the sector, increasing the coherence between policy, spending and results as well as reducing transaction costs (Roberts and Sejaaka, 2017). In 1998, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) aligned the budget with the sector approach with 16 defined sectors. The MDAs were required to work together under the leadership of an identified entity to submit Sector Budget Framework Papers and to hold regular sector working group meetings with relevant stakeholders, including Development Partners, the private sector and Civil Society Organisations.
6. The Sector Working Groups formed the basis for planning, coordination and monitoring of all activities in the sector. It had been proposed that the Sector Working Groups (SWGs) would be institutionalized and made binding with a lead agency and functional secretariat. The Sector Working Groups were variant in structure that included the constituent sub committees and the number of actors represented as well as functionality, which was measured in terms of the frequency of meetings, existence of key documents like work-plans, meeting minutes, existence of functional monitoring and evaluation tools.
7. The common success factors for of the SWGs included committed and quality leadership, an effective coordination function, clear articulation of shared goals and objectives, access to resources for joint activities, consistent development partners support, configuration of sectors and MDA memberships, strong incentives to engage in joint planning and budgeting, aid effectiveness at sector level, capacity of CSOs and private sector organisations to constructively dialogue with SWGs and their membership for feedback on service delivery to support informed dialogue as well as the capacity of sector institutions. While Sector Budget Framework Papers were a requirement by MoFPED, budgets were negotiated with individual MDAs and the objective of an integrated sector approach was never achieved.
8. Coordination of the NDP II was a complex challenge. It was complicated by involvement of development partners with off-budget resources and funds channelled through numerous partners such as UN agencies and NGOs. Relatedly, before (20 years) and or during the NDP II period, there was fragmentation of Ministries into 157 specialised autonomous and semi-autonomous authorities. Coordination was therefore essential to ensure that the best use was made of the limited resources by bringing together the various agencies in a sector to tackle major development challenges faced by the Country.
9. Cabinet approved the Institutional Framework for Coordination of Policy and Programme Implementation (IFCPPI) in 2003. The IFCPPI set out committee structures for consultation at a central level which should have provided support and guidance to sectors. The Technical Implementation Coordination Committee (TICC) that should have played a major role in identifying and raising crosscutting constraints that affected performance of sectors for consideration by higher

level policy makers was too large (included representatives of all Ministries) to be effective. Analogously, few sectors or subsectors established mechanisms for regular external reviews that could have provided independent checks on the progress of sector (Roberts and Sejjaaka, 2017).

1.2. Objectives of the NDP II Final Evaluation

10. The NDPII was designed to be implemented based on nine fundamental principles articulated in the Uganda Vision 2040, namely: ownership, political will; good governance; resource availability; balanced development; behaviour change; linkage with the national planning processes; sustainable and equitable development; and effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. The final evaluation assessed the nine Vision 2040 principles aimed to improve future policy formulation and planning and gaining lessons for better implementation of policies and programmes. The specific objectives of the final evaluation of NDP II were to:

- a) assess the extent to which the national strategies and priorities guided the pursuance towards the NDPII middle income status, objectives, sector, MDA and LG development results;
- b) identify and examine the factors that proved critical in helping or hindering the achievement of targeted outcomes;
- c) assess progress towards achievement of the prioritization framework and implementation of reforms;
- d) assess the role of the NDPII in influencing policy and its overall contribution to the realization of Uganda Vision 2040;
- e) assess the extent to which the NDPII implementation addressed vulnerability and other cross-cutting issues, including assessment of respective effects and impacts; and
- f) identify lessons for the design and implementation of future Plans, while ensuring sustainable development.

1.3. Methodology for NDPII Evaluation

1.3.1 Focus of NDPII evaluation

11 . Guided by documentary review and initial discussions with NPA staff, the key issues that were addressed as part of end evaluation of the NDP II included but were not limited to:

- a) assessed the extent of the progress made towards achievement of the NDPII goals, objectives, national strategies, priorities and sector and local government service targets and results;
- b) identified and examined the factors that proved critical in helping or hindering the achievement of targeted outcomes;
- c) assessed the progress towards unlocking the country's most binding constraints and implementation of reforms;
- d) assessed the role of the NDPII in influencing policy and its overall contribution to the realisation of Vision 2040;

- e) assessed the extent to which the NDPII implementation addressed vulnerability and other cross-cutting issues, including assessment of respective effects and impacts; and
- f) identified lessons for the design and implementation of future Plans, while ensuring sustainable development.

12. In addition to the high-level objectives, based on the overview of the Middle Term Review (MTR) results, the evaluation also addressed the following specific aspects:

- a) The extent to which the NDPII adopted the MTR results and recommendations with the objective of refining the implementation process and delivery of the intended objectives.
- b) Whether the institutional framework was appropriate to ensure a seamless implementation of the NDP II
- c) The extent to which resources were aligned to attain the objectives of the NDPII
- d) Whether during the second half of the NDP II objectives were prioritised and resources directed towards sectors that were identified to be critical for growth.
- e) The extent to which fiscal and monetary growth were realigned to support growth.
- f) Efforts were directed towards the re-alignment of institutions to effectively support a seamless and effective delivery of the NDPII.
- g) Whether there were any concrete measures that were implemented to enhance resource mobilization both from the collected revenues and donor support.

1.4. Adoption of OECD-DAC Evaluation Criteria

13. The NDPII end evaluation adopted and applied the international OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness and efficiency, impact and sustainability as highlighted below:

- a) **Relevance** – was the Plan well-conceived given the social, economic and political situation? Was it still relevant to the original problem it intended to address? To what extent did it contribute to the strategic direction of the Government and its partners? Was the national planning paradigm shift appropriate in the context of the political economy and other factors in the environment?
- b) **Coherence** – were Plan’s intervention consistent with key actors' interventions?
- c) **Effectiveness** – to what extent were the planned results achieved. What were the reasons for the state of achievement? What support and barriers affected achievement of results?. Review the comparative performance across service delivery priorities (Front loading infrastructure vis-a-vis social services).
- d) **Efficiency** – to what extent was the Plan cost-effective? Were the resources used cost effectively? Did the results (quantitatively and qualitatively) justify the resources expended?
- e) **Impact** - to what extent did the Plan contribute to the National Vision 2040 outcome targets and goals? Were there unanticipated positive and negative consequences? Why did they arise?

- f) **Sustainability** – was there an enabling environment that supported on-going positive impacts? Could the positive outcomes and impacts be sustained for achievement of middle income status and Uganda Vision 2040?

1.5. Scope of the NDP II Evaluation

14. The end evaluation of NDP II was in line with the MTR and applied the OECD-DAC Evaluation Criteria. It assessed the extent to which the MTR recommendations were implemented and how the lessons learnt would improve the successful execution of subsequent development plans. The report specifically focused on the institutional framework of the NDP II and its attendant implications. The questions summarised in **Table 1** galvanised the scope and analysis of the institutional framework end evaluation of the NDP II.

	Table 1: Specific questions/objectives for the Institutional Framework thematic Area
IF1	Determine the effect of the change of Government re-alignment as a result of NDP II structure of goals and objectives under a new institutional alignment
IF2	Determine the effectiveness and efficiency of government structures in public service delivery;
IF3	Determine the extent of integration of local governments, civil society, private sector and local development actors in the implementation of the NDP2.
IF4	To what extent was there ownership, unequivocal leadership and a sense of urgency and commitment to drive the changes envisaged in the NDP from the Cabinet / highest levels of Government?
IF5	How effective was the Forum (chaired by the President) and the NPA Board in reviewing progress of the NDP?
IF6	Assess efficiency gains realised through enhancement of inter and intra-sectoral linkages;
IF7	What was the actual institutional / management ‘architecture’ (for oversight, authority, accountability and management of NDP implementation as a sectoral (‘programmatic’) plan, and how effective has this been?
IF8	To what extent were the roles of NPA, OPM, MoFPED, MoPS, other MDAs and LG bodies separate, distinct, harmonised and carried out in order to maximise efficiency and effectiveness of NDP II preparation, implementation and monitoring?
IF9	What were the mechanisms for aligning the NDP II to resource allocation and how could they be improved?
IF10	To what extent was NDP II implementation at the Local Government level enabled or hindered?
IF11	To what extent did institutions work together to effectively develop, deliver and monitor cross sectoral policy outcomes / results relevant to the NDP II?
IF12	To what extent did the NDPII influence policy, planning and budgeting at all levels?
IF13	To what extent did government structural changes led to more efficient and effective delivery of NDP II objectives?
IF14	How effectively did central and local government, civil society and the private sector work together for joined-up implementation of the NDP II?

1.6. Organisation of the Report

15. The report was structured in six parts. The *first part* provided an overview of the background and rationale of the institutional framework for the implementation of NDP 2. The *second part* gave an overview of the second national development plan. The *third part* summarized the findings and recommendations of the Middle Term Review. The *fourth part* examined the effectiveness of sector specific institutions that were deemed to be more directly responsible for the implementation of activities and mandates aligned to the four strategic objectives of the NDP2. The *fifth part* highlighted the key institutional planning and implementation challenges. The *sixth part* highlighted major findings and made recommendations for subsequent NDPs.

PART II: OVERVIEW OF THE SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN

2.1. Implementation Framework for NDP II

16. NDP I lacked the needed commitment from its leadership and stewardship and there was a fissure in enforcing planned regular oversight reviews compounded by a high affinity by state actors to operate in silos. The reforms proposed for the implementation of NDP II were intended to address the bottlenecks identified during the implementation of NDP I. The implementation and coordination roles and monitoring and evaluation responsibilities of state and non-states for the NDP II were summarised in **Annex 1**.

17. The institutional and systemic reforms envisioned to improve ownership of NDP 2 by both state and non-state actors and augment the political and technical leadership. To address implementation bottlenecks, existing institutional implementation arrangements were strengthened and the following reforms were suggested: In relation to the **Political ownership and leadership**, the NDP II Implementation Strategy recommended that:

- a) The overall implementation, management and oversight roles remained under the overall guidance of H.E the President of the Republic of Uganda and through appropriate structures and the principle of collective responsibility was embraced.
- b) The NDP II implementation strategy further recommended that a Committee of Cabinet Ministers to focus on tracking implementation of the NDP II would be established. The committee was to be composed of Technical Cabinet ministers and not just members of Constituencies. The proposed standing committee of Cabinet to focus entirely on NDP issues was not established and the Cabinet Committees remained ad hoc serving for a short life span.

18. In regards to the **Technical Leadership** of the NDP II Implementation it was recommended that:

- (i) A Delivery Unit (implementation) whose initial focus was six key priority areas of Government (education and skills development, health, works and transport, energy,

minerals, oil and gas, trade and industry and poverty and wealth creation) would be established in the Office of the Prime Minister to track implementation of Government projects and programmes. The Delivery Unit was supposed to strengthen the coordination and monitoring roles of the OPM. The Delivery Unit was established but its effectiveness was affected by understaffing (50%), all its staff had not yet been trained in delivery of government programs and the unit was poorly facilitated to optimally function.

- (ii) A prerequisite institutional framework for operation of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) implementation modality was to be established at MoFPED as platform for mobilising resources from the private sector and increasing private sector participation national development.


Building on the implementation experiences of the NDP I, it was recommended that the National Planning Authority (NPA) should be located under the direct supervision of H.E the President. The NPA reported to the Minister of State for Planning (MoFPED) to operationalize Section (2) (c) of the NPA Act, 2002 that required NPA to advise H.E on policies and strategies for development of Uganda. Remedial arrangements such as the appointment of the Chair of NPA as a non-executive member to Cabinet though not institutionalized was a welcomed gesture to strategically position the NPA. The terminal evaluation of the NDP II noted that NPA could have been still struggling with insufficient political visibility and strategic positioning in the bureaucratic structure to influence development-planning decisions.

The 5-year PIP was developed as an Annex to the NDP II with project profiles. It had both approved projects and project ideas at different levels of development and hence was a project databank for the NDP II. The approved project were costed and cost estimates were provided for project ideas. The printed copies of the PIP were not enough for all the MDAs and hence the electronic version should have been shared.

The NPA issued Certificates of Compliance (CoC) to MDAs for the entire NDP 2 period. The Certificates of Compliance were important in the sense that they enabled NPA to inform Parliament about the extent to which the annual budgets (National, MDAs and LGs) of the previous FY had been aligned to the NDP II priorities. The overall Certificate of Compliance assessment should be outsourced or carried out by a specific unit within the NPA to avoid conflict of interest (s).

19. The implementation Coordination Framework was summarised in **Figure 2**.

Figure 2: NDP II Implementation Coordination Framework



Source: NPA, 2015 Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy for the NDP II (2015/16- 2019/20) pg. 276

2.2. NDP 2 Oversight Institutions

20. The oversight mandates of the implementation institutions illustrated in **Figure 2** were summarised as follows:

- a) **Cabinet** supported by the Cabinet Secretariat headed by the Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service executed its overall mandate of coordinating the policy making and management process as well as implementation of cabinet decisions during the implementation period of the NDP II. The Cabinet Secretariat supported the Presidency in its role of provision of overall leadership in public policy management and the promotion of good governance in public institutions. It provided support to Cabinet in its discharge of Constitutional mandates of formulating, determining and implementing Government policy (NDP II, 2015). The ad hoc

nature and lack of a standing committee of Cabinet to specifically handle issues related to national development planning and implementation narrowed the landscape for a seamless and efficient implementation of NDP II.

- b) **Parliament** executed oversight, legislation and appropriation roles. A Committee of Parliament fully dedicated to development planning was not set up to enable Parliament fulfil its oversight functions related to national development planning. The absence of a specific Committee of Parliament made it impossible to have an annual oversight report of the NDP II produced and laid before Parliament to facilitate follow-up and continuity. The Finance and Planning Committee and the Budget and National Economy Committee served as the committees closest to the NDP dispensation. The technical staff at Parliament of Uganda were emphatic to effect that re-configuration of Parliamentary Committees required amendment of the relevant laws that prescribed how Parliament conducted its business.
- c) **The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)** played its primary coordination role during the implementation period of the NDP II across MDAs amidst a landscape of weak and unstreamlined institutional structures. The Institutional Framework for Coordination of Policy and Program Implementation in Government (IFCPPI) under OPM operated mainly under the framework of the Public Sector Management Working Group (PSM-WG). The PSM-WG Policy Coordination Committee (PCC), a Cabinet Committee chaired by the Prime Minister was responsible for policy coordination and monitoring progress on implementation of government programs. The Head of Public Service/Secretary to Cabinet directed implementation activities of the NDP II and chaired the Implementation Coordination Steering Committee (ICSC) whose membership were Permanent Secretaries. The multi-sectoral Technical Implementation Coordination Committee (TICC) chaired by the Permanent Secretary OPM coordinated and monitored program implementations across ministries and sectors. The TICC would have been more effective if the meetings had been organised with a few (one or two) sectors at a time to enable constructive exchange of experiences, identification of challenges and constraints affecting performance of sectors as well as agreeing on policy issues that required higher-level decisions or actions (Roberts and Sejjaaka, 2017).
- ⇨ **The National Planning Authority (NPA)** produced comprehensive and integrated development plans for the country especially in terms of the perspective vision, long term and medium term plans. The NPA coordinated joint implementation planning with MDAs and LGs within the NDP framework. NPA developed the results framework for the NDP and ensured that state and non-states actors developed result indicators that were consistent with the NDP.

In addition, NPA prepared overall annual national development reports that highlighted progress or non-progress on issues relating to the strategic components of the NDP II. The annual national development reports were supposed to be one of the input documents for the NDP Annual Review Forum. The annual national development reports should have

played a major role in identifying and raising crosscutting constraints that affected performance of sectors for consideration by higher level policy makers.

The attempt by NPA to enhance the capacity of District Planning Officers through targeted trainings was stiffened by limited funding. During FY 2019/20 with support from the World Bank, NPA trained 52 officers from selected MDAs and LGs. The training focused on capital investment planning, investment appraisal and preparation of project documents, infrastructure design and project costing, PPP negotiations and report preparation. The efforts of NPA were complemented by MoFPED that trained 50 officers from various MDAs and equipped them with skills to conduct integrated analysis of investment projects.

NPA, however, should have been optimally financed and staffed to ensure seamless implementation of NDPs. In July 2015, only 78 (65.5%) positions were filled against an establishment of 119. During the FY 2019/20 (June 2020) 108 (59.6%) positions were filled of the approved 181 positions. By August 2022, 125 (69%) positions were filled against an establishment of 181. Relatedly, NPA aligned its Strategic Plan (2020/21-2024/5) to NDP III with a staff established of 327 to implement the NDP III Program Approach. By August 2022 NPA still operated with a staff establishment of 181 instead of the desired 327 for the NDP III. If NPA had operationalized its strategic plan which had been aligned to the NDP III it would have required a wage of Ugx 39,832,539,084 instead of Ugx 14,610, 649,932, that had been maintained for the FY 2020/21 and FY 2021/22. The NDP III was hence implemented using the NDP II staff establishment which constrained NPA in terms of staff to seamless implement the NDP III. Relatedly, NPA had costed its Strategic Plan (2015/6-2019/20) at Ugx 224.12bn but only Ugx 119.457bn (53.3%) was released leaving a funding gap of Ugx 104.663bn. The NPA was therefore not spared by the financial cancer of underfunding, under facilitation and under staffing during the NDP II period.

2.2. NDP II Monitoring and Evaluation Forums

21. During the implementation period of the NDP I only an Annual Review Forum was deemed necessary. The NDP II implementation strategy included three additional corresponding monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to bolster and facilitate a seamless implementation of the plan. The monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for the NDP II were summarized below:
 - a) **NDP Annual Review Forum:** The Forum comprised of: Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, Local Governments, Cultural Institutions, Development Partners, Faith Based Organizations (FBOs), Civil Society Organizations and Private Sector Representatives. The forum Chaired by H.E. the President to which NPA was the secretariat was supposed to meet on a bi-annual basis to assess the performance of the NDP II by reviewing reports of projects and programmes at the various stages of the public investment management cycle. The NPA annual national development reports were envisaged to form the core basis for the Forum

discussions. The terminal evaluation confirmed that the NDP Annual Review Forum was not constituted and hence was non-existent.

- b) **Sector Review Forum (SRF):** The membership of the SRF included all MDAs, Development Partners, Private Sector, Faith-Based Organisations, Cultural Institutions and civil society organizations that operated in the specified sector. The SRF would use independent assessors to assess the progress of the NDP II and ensure increased civil society participation. The NPA was supposed to play a significant role in the Annual Sector Review assessments. The terminal evaluation of the NDP II established that the SRFs were not functional.
- c) **The Private Sector and Civil Society Review Forum** was meant to focus on reviewing the status of the projects across the project management cycle, with particular emphasis on Public Private Partnerships and document lessons learnt from project evaluations. NPA would provide technical support to the Forum during its assessment of the performance of Government policies and programmes. The end evaluation of NDP II confirmed the non-existence and-functionality of the Private Sector and Civil Society Forum.
- d) **The Local Government Review Forum** was to specifically review the performance of LG (district-level) projects and programmes at the various stages of the public investment management on an annual basis. The Forum membership included urban authorities, the private sector, FBOs, Cultural Institutions and CSOs. The end evaluation of the NDP II confirmed the absence and non-functionality of the Forum despite its strategic oversight importance in enhancing LG priority setting and implementation of NDP II.

PART III: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF NDP II MIDDLE TERM REVIEW

3.1. Findings of NDP II Middle Term Review

The Middle Term Review highlighted a number of findings during the first half of the implementation period of the NDP II namely:

- 22. The NDP II MTR noted that whereas an elaborate implementation institutional framework including four review forums was proposed to ensure a seamless implementation of the NDP 2, its implementation was highly constrained by weak M & E capacity and systems at both LG and MDA levels. The failure to undertake annual stakeholder reviews during the NDP 2 period was a lost opportunity for such forums to purposely direct all their planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluations efforts towards attainment of medium and long term targets conceived in relation to the national Vision 2040.
- 23. The Cabinet Standing Committee and the Parliamentary Committee that were proposed to be set up and focus entirely on matters related to the NDP were never operationalized hence rendering the efforts to improve the political and technical leadership of the NDP II untenable.

24. As the number of specialised agencies under line ministries and across sectors increased, there was real and or perceived duplication of effort, inter-agency competition and escalation of costs and hence wastage thereby making the need to rationalise MDAs imminent.
25. Across MDAs and LGs underfunding, understaffing, insufficient facilitation and inadequate attention to building technical capacity undermined the effectiveness, efficiency and capacity of state actors to deliver timely and adequate quality public services which in addition made it difficult for them to meaningfully implement, monitor and evaluate their NDP II interventions.
26. Local Government stakeholders expressed displeasure towards the tendency of increased recentralisation of authority and functions by the Government since it undermined the principles and values of decentralisation whose main purpose was to ensure devolution of central authority to lower level governments especially districts. Throughout NDP2, the essence of a decentralised system offering the best to its citizens continued to dwindle due to limited financing, low workforce capacity and the proliferation of new districts without corresponding increase in decentralised financing.

3.2. NDP II MTR Recommendations

The NDP II MTR made a number of recommendations namely:

27. There was need by the higher level oversight and coordination institutions (Cabinet, The OPM, NPA, MoFPED) to mutually commit to a deliberate and purposeful ‘drive to make things happen’ and to have a committee of parliament that would entirely focus on National Development Planning.
28. There was need to strategically and hierarchically position NPA to carry stronger clout over other MDAs and provide timely and technical advice on policies that drive National Development Planning through generation of policy research papers and identification of institutional bottlenecks that would require reforms and adjustments to efficiently and effectively propel positive NDP results.
29. It was paramount to adequately equip and address the technical staffing gaps including extension services of LGs to take advantage of their strategic positioning within the NDP delivery structures that brought them closer to the end users of development to deliver NDP priority interventions such as agriculture, health and education to provide room for the principle of subsidiarity to adequately inform the character of decentralised institutional mandates.
30. At Sectoral level, it was recommended that NPA should take lead in the re-constitution process of SWGs and develop their terms of reference to augment joint development planning, prioritisation and reporting and implement strategies to enhance leadership, technical and financial capacity as well as other incentives for improved coordination and collaboration.

31. The NDP II MTR recommendation in relation to the rationalization report was three fold: (i) for some MDAs rationalisation was to be executed without further analysis; (ii) some MDAs required more in-depth functional analyses before rationalisation and (iii) some recommendations would be stayed for the medium term.

- (i) Agencies where rationalisation could be implemented without need for further analysis included the following:
 - a. Merging Agricultural Chemical Board and National Drug Authority into one agency but leaving Uganda National Bureau of Standards out of this merger. Leave the UNBS out of this merger due to its unique and overstretched role of ensuring standards of all manufactured goods.
 - b. Transferring the Electricity Regulatory Authority back to MEMD to strengthen policy, regulatory, inspection and monitoring function of the Ministry. However, the status regarding the Petroleum Authority of Uganda should remain until practical lessons were identified.
 - c. Transferring the Uganda Atomic Council to MEMD for consistent policy pursuance.
 - d. Merging Uganda Communications Commission and NITA-U due to technological convergence reasons.
 - e. Creating one council with specialized departments for Uganda Nurses and Midwives, Allied Health Professional, Medical and Dental Practitioners and Pharmacists.
 - f. Merging Post Bank and Pride Micro finance to create one adequately capitalized public commercial bank that will lead to enhanced financial intermediation in rural areas of the country. The arrangement should exclude the Micro Finance Support Centre a lender to micro finance agencies.
 - g. Merging Economic Policy Research Centre and National Population Secretariat with the National Planning Authority. The merger could strengthen the research component of NPA. The advocacy component of the population secretariat should, however, be transferred to MoGLSD under the Directorate of Social Development. A Director General under a single full-time board will then head the NPA.
 - h. Merging Uganda Investment Authority, Uganda Free Zones Authority and Uganda Exports Promotion Board. Leave Private Sector Foundation out of the merger to avoid compromising its advocacy role. Enterprise Uganda be left out of the merger because its skills development arm has no role in investment and export promotion.
 - i. Reintegration of NAADS, Uganda Trypanosomiasis Control, Cotton Development Organization, Dairy Development and Coffee Development Authorities into MAAIF would enhance coordination and policy and programme implementation.

- j. Phasing out the Non-Performing Assets Trust and Departed Asians Custodian Board.
 - k. Transferring the UNCST mandate and functions to the MSTI
 - l. Merging the various councils for the vulnerable into one council (National Youth, National Women, Children, Disability and Older Persons councils) to improve coordination and balanced affirmative action.
- (ii) It was recommended that the following MDAs required more in-depth functional analyses prior to any merger decision.
- a. Merger of UNRA, SGR, URC, Transport Licensing Board, National Roads Safety Council and Marine Transport into a single infrastructure development agency should be reconsidered to avoid back and forth policy reversals.
 - b. Merging the Insurance Regulatory Authority, Uganda Retirement Benefits Regulatory Authority, Capital Markets Authority and Uganda Microfinance Regulatory Authority would require further review given that the functions of all these agencies are very distinct and hardly relate to each other.
 - c. Mergers under the Tourism sector should be restricted to Uganda Wildlife Authority and Uganda Wildlife Education Trust, with the Uganda Tourism Board left out of the merger to enable it focus on its core mandate of promotion and marketing of tourism.
 - d. Merging the Uganda National Examinations Board with the Uganda Business Technical Examinations Board, UAHEB and UNMEB requires more consideration given that each examination board applies different examination approaches.
- (iii) The MTR recommended that the mergers of the following MDAs could be stayed:
- a. Mainstreaming the functions of the National Lotteries Board into the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development required further study given that National Lotteries were a private activity whereby the role of government/MoFPED stops at regulating them.
 - b. The National Identification and Registration Authority, Uganda Registration Services Bureau, Uganda Non-Governmental Registration Board and National Citizenship and Immigration Control play different roles, have different objectives and deliver different results. Their merger into one agency complicates coordination, budgeting and planning for results.
 - c. The evaluation did not support the notion of merging Rural Electrification Agency, Uganda Electricity Distribution Company, Uganda Electricity Generation Company and Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Ltd. At the time Uganda Electricity Board played the role of these four companies, it was a sole monopoly in generation of power. With more players generating power, this would require specialized agencies because of the varying tasks in generation, transmission and distribution.

- d. The evaluation did not recommend the transfer of National Records and Archives Authority to Ministry of Public Service as there are enormous advantages in the semi-autonomy of the National Records and Archives Authority and risks associated with archiving or National records with a Ministry whose mandate is different.
 - e. Consolidation of social programs such as the Youth Livelihood, Women and disabled persons funds into the Uganda Development Bank is inappropriate. The bank's core mandate is to lend to private investors.
 - f. Consolidation of funds for microfinance activities under MDAs into a Directorate of Microfinance in MoFPED is also inappropriate given that savings are private sector initiatives with different and unique objectives.
 - g. The Hotel and Tourism Institute-Jinja should remain under the Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities, while the Ministry of Education and Sports should continue its regulatory role on curriculum and examinations.
 - h. Merging the Uganda Warehousing Receipt Systems Authority with the Uganda Commodity Exchange would be erroneous. Commodity Exchange is mainly for purposes of hedging against financial risk while the warehousing receipt system is for safeguarding against post-harvest losses.
 - i. The transfer of the Directorate of Urban Water Supply to the National Water and Sewerage Corporation should be stayed as Urban water has a role to play in policy formulation and extension of free water to many existing and emerging urban areas where NWSC may not reach in the medium term.
32. It was recommended that functional analyses should be undertaken on all government MDAs to enhance efficiency within government.
33. It was recommended that the Delivery Unit established in the OPM be fully operationalized and its relationship with the rest of government (MDAs) should be well articulated.

PART IV: INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE TOWARDS ACHIEVEMENT OF NDP2 OBJECTIVES

34. The platform for the implementation of the NDP II was the existing institutional frameworks. Uganda's institutional architecture was clustered into two key blocks: state and non-state actors. The state institutional framework consisted of the: executive, legislature and judiciary while non-state actors included civil society, private sector, academia and the media. The implementation of NDP 2 was inclusive and hinged on a highly participatory planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation framework.
35. The lessons learnt during the implementation of NDP 1 formed the basis for the institutional and systemic reforms directed towards a seamless implementation of the NDP II. The institutional reforms aimed to strengthen: (i) the political leadership and ownership of NDP II and (ii) the technical leadership of NDPII implementation (NDP II, 2015). The major pitfall was the inability of these institutions to function in a coordinated manner to optimize their capacities towards achievement of common national development goals.

36. Previous assessments of the Uganda's institutional framework asserted that MDAs had a high affinity to operate as silos with attendant systemic and institutional challenges such as low enforcement of critical reforms and innovations, overlapping and in some cases conflicting mandates, low levels of productivity attributed to poor work ethic and inadequate funding.

37. Analogously, the capacity of LGs to deliver adequate and quality decentralised services was hindered by the fact that they heavily relied on the Government for funding amidst dwindling local revenues. The tendency by the Government to rescind some formerly decentralised services such as appointment of accounting officers, local revenue management and the physical planning function further weakened the LGs in their delivery of decentralised services.

4.1 Institutional performance of the Private Sector and Non-State Actors

38. The Private sector played an important role as an engine of economic growth and job creation in developing countries. It provided goods and services, generated tax revenues to finance essential social and economic infrastructure and developed new and innovative solutions that helped to tackle development challenges (UNDP, 2022). The Private Sector was a key driver of growth and development in Uganda. Out of the estimated NDP 2 budget of 196.7 trillion, the Government of Uganda contributed 113.7 trillion (57.8%) while the private sector contributed 83 trillion (42.2%).

39. The private sector in Uganda was dominated by micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and a large informal sector but its 110, 000 enterprises employed an estimated 2.5 million people equivalent to 90 % off-farm private sector workers². In 2012, the majority (93%) of the private sector enterprises operated on a micro to small scale and employed less than five employees each. It was noted that the private sector, however, faced a number of challenges during the NDP II period that included a high cost of doing business, which was largely attributed to the high cost of energy and transportation of goods. Other challenges were the low labour productivity, bureaucracy arising from slow reforms in the business regulatory regimes and weaknesses in the financial services sector (MoFPED, 2017).

40. In recognition of the complementary role the private sector played in development, the Government of Uganda formalised the Public Private Partnership (PPP) Framework Policy in 2010. The PPP Policy provided a framework that would enable public and private sectors to work together to improve public service delivery through private sector provision of public infrastructure and related services (MoFPED, 2011). Roberts and Sejjaka (2017) asserted that poor public sector attitude that failed to recognise that MDAs were ultimately answerable to the tax paying public in general negatively impacted the development of a formidable PPP model.

² MoFPED – National strategy for Private sector Development 2017

41. It was anticipated that the application of PPP in provision of public services and infrastructure would result in: (i) better utilization and allocation of public funds, (ii) more efficient development and delivery of public infrastructure, (iii) good quality public services and (iv) increased economic growth and foreign direct investments. The PPP Unit established under MoFPED was expected support MDAs assess projects, choose the best possible partner, negotiate agreements and monitor them (MoFPED, 2010).

42. In addition to a private sector led approach to development, GoU pursued an export oriented, quasi market approach to fast track strategic infrastructure, industrialization and skills development strategies during the NDP II period. The terminal evaluation noted that the Project Analysis and PPP unit were established in the MoFPED to support the analysis of investment proposals developed to attract public private partnerships. Notwithstanding, the uptake of using PPP to finance projects has been slow due to their complexity and it required enhancing capacity of the public sector in negotiation and project analysis.

43. The Civil Society remained affordable advocacy vehicle for requisite reforms directed towards improving the quality of life of citizens. The heavy reliance on external funding by the CSOs, however, raised issues of financial sustainability. The expanded board of NPA provided a platform for CSO representation and constructive engagement with other stakeholders of the NPA Board in relation to good governance and development planning. Analogously, the media continued to be a key player in development by highlighting different aspects that needed more attention by implementing, monitoring and evaluation agencies of public programmes and or projects.

44. In order to improve the monitoring and evaluation function of both the private sector and civil society under the NDP II, **the Private Sector and Civil Society Forum** provided for its members to review the performance status of Government programmes and projects across the project management cycle. Lesson learnt were to be documented for future improvement in assessing the performance of programmes and projects implemented under the PPP framework. The Forum was not functional thereby defeating the purpose for which it was proposed.

4.2. Institutional Performance of Local Governments (LG)

45. Decentralisation was provided for under the 1995 Constitution, in the form of devolution. The Policy was operationalized by the Local Governments Act Cap 243 of 1997. Decentralisation was crafted as a means to modify, reform, and improve local governance in order to improve service delivery and local development.

46. In 1993, the Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute created the legal framework for decentralization, which was galvanised by the 1997 Decentralisation Policy Framework. Uganda chose “devolution” because it gave citizens or their elected representatives, decision-making power and granted “local-level” governments discretionary powers to act independently in their areas of jurisdiction, thus reducing the control by Government (Mugabi, 2004).

47. The conceptualisation of the decentralisation policy and programmes was intended to: (i) build democratic governance that was responsive and accountable to the public and (ii) promote capacity building at the local level to introduce local choices into the delivery of services and foster a sense of local ownership. Decentralisation was for better service delivery to the people and enhancement of ownership as well as participation in Government programmes by the local communities (Mushemeza, 2019).
48. Since 1997, Uganda pursued a devolution form of decentralisation in which political, administrative and fiscal powers were transferred to elected local leaders (executive and councillors) as well as service delivery systems and processes placed in the hands of local government technical officials. Local citizens were given the right to hold local leaders accountable through elected representatives to Local Government Councils: District Councils, Municipal Councils, Sub-County Councils, Town Councils, and all-inclusive Village/Cell Councils.
49. Under the guidance of the MoLG, District Local Councils (DLCs) provided and or facilitated the delivery of a number of decentralised services. The decentralised services included primary education and health services by General hospitals, health centres, dispensaries and aid posts as well as the construction and maintenance of district, urban and community access roads. Other decentralised services included the provision and maintenance of rural water supplies; agricultural extension services, land administration and surveying as well as community development. The multitude of decentralised services provided by DLCs put them at the centre in the implementation of every public policy, plan or strategy and hence earned the acronymia “super MDAs.”
50. In addition, LGs raised local revenue; approved their own budgets; altered or created new boundaries within their areas of jurisdiction and appointed statutory commissions, boards and committees such as District Service Commissions (DSCs); District Land Boards (DLB); District/City and Municipal Contracts Committees³, LG Public Accounts Committees and administered their own payroll and pension.
51. The MoLG and LGs despite bearing the burden to deliver decentralised services were grossly under-facilitated and under funded by Government and worse still conditional grants from the centre accounted for over 85 per cent of LG funding. Conditional grants provided no room to LGs to allocate resources to their would have been priorities yet the local revenue continued to dwindle amidst a high rate of population growth which further constrained the delivery of decentralised services. In 2019, Districts raised only about 3% of their revenues from local revenue sources. The situation was dramatized by Kibuku district which received only 0.6% of its revenue from local sources (ACODE, 2019).
52. Community participation in monitoring of Government programmes and projects as well as ensuring optimal day-to-day provision of public and decentralised services through established structures such as school management committees and health management committees remained

³ Sub-counties and Town Council used the relevant Contract Committees.

weak, despite its known value in promoting accountability, local ownership and sustainability of projects.

53. The Barazas coordinated by the Office of the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) at the Sub-County levels were irregular and ineffective. The Barazas were intended to ensure effective and efficient implementation of Government programmes and projects by providing a platform for creating awareness, responding to matters affecting communities, sharing vital information and providing residents with the opportunity to identify and propose solutions to peculiar challenges affecting their areas.
54. In addition, villages and households were supposed to participate in the implementation of the NDPII programmes and projects by demanding for accountability from implementers and supervisors of Government programmes and projects. It was, however, noted that it was not until 2018 that resources were allocated to elect parish and village councils, which had been last elected in 2002. The absence of legitimate councils (*for 16 years*) to monitor Government programmes and service delivery at Parish and Village levels was a misnomer to decentralisation (ACODE, 2017).
55. The NDPII Parish Barazas based on initiatives in the office of the Prime Minister to promote downward accountability were not regular. The non-functionality of Parish Barazas exposed a perilous institutional failure that undermined the participation of citizens and communities in the development process and provision of a platform for demanding social accountability. The Parish Bazaras only became active and instrumental recently in promoting the Parish Development Model.
56. There were undertones (LG Stakeholders) that the MoLG had not strongly played its role of advocacy for the decentralisation principles and left it to the LG associations, which had to do it through the line Ministry. Relatedly, the LG Finance Commission, whose mandate was to advocate for finance of LGs, was unfortunately unfunded and could not optimally function.
57. In addition to underfunding and inadequate facilitation, there were also undertones of increased re-centralisation of authority by the Government that undermined the principles and values of decentralisation. The re-centralisation was in relation to: (i) Appointment of Accounting Officers, (ii) Local Revenue Management (Public Finance Management Act, 2005), local revenue was remitted to the Single Treasury Account and (iii) the National Building Planning Board limited the powers of LGs in physical planning since it could overturn or alter LGs decisions.
58. The GoU Asset Management Framework and Guidelines, 2020 (MoFPED, 2020) required all Accounting Officers to “put in place effective systems of risks management, internal control and internal audit,” which were ideal for asset management in line with S45 (2). It was important to closely monitor the usage of the assets to ensure that they are optimally utilized and maintained to avoid their deterioration that could shorten the asset’s useful life. Asset management was recentralised through appointment of Board Surveys and the need for LGs to get clearance before acquisition and dispose of assets that were formally a source of local revenue. The LGs were

therefore demotivated from acquiring additional assets that they could not easily dispose off to earn local revenues.

59. There were assertions by LG stakeholders that a number of provisions in the PFMA, 2015 were unconstitutional. Section 51 of the PFMA, 2015 did not make provisions that enabled LG Councils to appropriate their own budgets yet Article 191 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 did not allow appropriation of money without the relevant LG Council. The PFMA, 2015 asserted it would take precedent over other acts.
60. Lack of capacity at district and sub-county levels made it difficult for the LGs to fulfil their mandates including effectively delivering their development plans, which was worsened by the growing trend towards re-centralisation of formerly decentralised financial functions. The creation of new administrative units, town councils for many districts reduced their tax revenue posing a threat to real service delivery in both old and new LGs. In addition, limited coordination with Government and the decentralisation of corruption hampered the effectiveness of decentralisation (ACODE, 2017).
61. There was no evidence that the creation of more administrative units had improved the delivery of decentralised services. The creation of additional administrative units increased administrative costs and diverted financial resources from service delivery. Government had been advised against the creation of further administrative units because resources that could be used for service delivery were absorbed by administrative costs but on the contrary the political motivation for creating more administrative units was inclined towards taking services closer to the people.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE KEY GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES

62. The first strategic objective of NDP2 prioritised investments in three “key growth opportunities” (KGOs); Agriculture; Tourism and Minerals, Oil and Gas. The details regarding the institutional framework of each of three KGOs, were summarised in the subsequent sections below.

4.3 Institutional Framework for Agriculture

63. The NDP II focused on agriculture as one of the three “key growth opportunities”. Agriculture was expected to play a vital role in increasing wealth creation and propelling Uganda to a middle income status by 2020 through commercialisation of agriculture. Commercial agriculture was anticipated to increase among others production and productivity along the agricultural value chains, access to critical farm inputs as well as strengthen the institutional capacity of the agriculture sector.
64. The public institutional framework for agriculture consisted of Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) as the line ministry. Other public sectors namely included National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO), National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), Cotton Development Organisation (CDO), Dairy Development Authority (DDA), National Genetic Resource Centre and Databank (NAGRIC&DB), Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA) and Control of Trypanosomiasis in Uganda (COCTU) (NDP 2a, 2015).

65. The MAAIF reinforced by the Top Policy Management (TPM) team provided an oversight role to implement of the Sector policies and programmes. The Agriculture Sector Working Group (ASWG) was a platform for planning, coordinating, monitoring and reviewing the performance of MAAIF. The Permanent Secretary chaired the ASWG. Under the ASWG were sub-committees that dealt with project appraisals and its membership included: the Commissioner Planning, Principal Economist, two representatives of Development partners (USAID and IFAD) and representative of CSO (CIDI) and NPA.

66. The ASWG met quarterly and the Planning Department in MAAIF provided secretariat services. Projects implemented in the sector were appraised by TWGs and the ASWG. Tracking of Development Partners off- budget investments was still problematic. The SWG submitted periodic reports to the Office of the President and Quarterly and Annual Reports to the OPM. The Sector prepared Quality Assurance Reports after data collection from Local Governments (LGs) and LG Finance Commission (LGFC). Feedback was got through Regional Joint Agriculture Sector Annual review (AUG/SEPT after the closure of the FY) and National Joint Annual Reviews (AUG /SEPT 29th -30th AUG 2019) that were conducted at specific times.

67. The agriculture sector faced a number of challenges which included but were not limited to inadequate funding, low staffing levels and recurring pests, vectors and diseases negatively impacting on the production of both crop and animal subsectors, inadequate quality inputs to meet farmer demands, sustainable land management issues and high dependence on rain fed agriculture (Parliament of Uganda, 2018).

68. *Agriculture Sector Budget Allocation.* Whereas the Government was committed to funding the agriculture sector as evidenced by increases from Ugx 735.839bn (FY 2016/17) to Ugx 865.202 (FY 2017/18), the allocations were still below the Government's reaffirmed Malabo (AU) commitment to allocate 10% of the national budget to agriculture.

69. For effective control against pests, vectors and diseases, MAAIF required a total of Ugx 34.5 bn but only UGX 1.5 billion was available in the MTEF leaving a funding gap of UGX 23 billion during FY 2018/19. In FY 2018/19, NARO had planned to relocate the Livestock Research Institute from Sukulu hills to Maruzi and invest in the development of anti-tick vaccines for the control of brown ear, blue and bont legged ticks in Uganda, which cost the country over UGX 18.6 billion a year. The vaccine production unit would have enabled Uganda to commercially produce vaccines for ticks, foot and mouth disease and other incidental vectors/diseases that would come on board. The livestock Research Institute was not transferred from Sikulu hills to Maruzi and the vaccine production was yet to begin.

70. ***Production and Productivity.***

- a) ***Banana*** was one of the major crops that promoted food security and had a potential of creating wealth for households. Banana production in 2014 amounted to 4.6 million MT, of which 99,169 MT were exported generating USD 4.8 million which was projected to increase to USD 630 million from 13 million MT by 2020.
- b) ***Cassava*** contributed towards poverty alleviation, increased food and nutrition security, provided raw materials for animal feed and alcohol manufacturing and bio-fuel ethanol

industries. Cassava production in 2014 amounted to 5.5 million MT, which was expected to increase to 7 million MT by 2020. Cassava had a huge potential to reduce the import bill on wheat, modified starch and with an import substitution effect of USD 30 million per year.

- c) Cotton was a source of income and employment to 250,000 households and was ranked the third most important crop after coffee and tea in Uganda. Although cotton production increased over the NDP II period, it was, however, far below the estimated potential of 1,000,000 bales at full employment level (Government of Uganda, 2009). Cotton generated export revenue, which increased from US\$ 20.8 million in 2015 to US\$ 31.6 million in 2016 (UBoS, 2017). Uganda had targeted to produce 64,750 MT of cotton by 2020, valued at approximately USD 113 million. Uganda, however, exported \$20.3m in raw cotton, making it the 28th largest exporter of raw cotton in the world.
- d) **The Dairy industry** in Uganda had a high impact on rural incomes, employment and nutrition and over 1.7 million households kept livestock. Households that kept livestock had a lower level of poverty than those that were engaged only in crop farming. Milk production increased from 2.5 billion litres in 2018 to 2.8 billion litres in 2020. The rise was attributed to the expansion of milk collection centres across the country. Uganda's revenue from export of dairy products rose from \$131.5m (Shs 480bn) in 2018 to \$205m (750bn) in 2020 according to records from the Dairy Development Authority (DDA).
- e) During the FY 2019/20, DDA trained 4,441 dairy stakeholders along the value chain, 441 milk handling equipment and utensils were procured and distributed, 3,246 dairy premises/equipment/consignments were inspected, 5,015 milk and milk product samples were analysed and pasture seeds were distributed in milk producing regions (MoFPED, 2020f).
- f) Overall, the percentage of farming households involved in modern agriculture increased from 33% in FY 2018/19 to 41.3% in 2019/20. Relatedly, efforts to reduce the labour force in subsistence agriculture were significant during the FY 2019/20. There were 3.8 million people employed in subsistence agriculture against the NDPII target of 3 million.

71. **Pests, Vector and Disease Control.** The annual loss in priority crops due to pest and diseases was estimated at USD 35-200 million (bananas), USD 60-80 (cassava), USD 10 million for cotton and USD 8 million for coffee during the FY 2018/19. Relatedly farmers in Uganda made post-harvest losses due inadequate handling and storage practices at household level. Farmers lost more than 30% of their crops annually to insects, pests, mold and moisture (Parliament of Uganda, 2018). Percentage of farmers equipped with skills in post-harvest handling technologies, however, increased from 40 % in the FY 2018/19 to 41.2 % in the FY2019/20, though this was still below the NDPII target of 50 percent. The increment was because the MAAIF embarked on training farmers through the extension workers at the district local government in post-harvest handling.

72. There was a reduction in the incidence of pests, vectors and diseases from 16% in FY 2018/19 to 14.2% during the FY 2019/20 that was attributed to the increase in the number of inspectors, recruited long stock routes. The quantity of livestock vaccines purchased increased from 2,350,880

doses in FY2018/19 to 3,011,000 doses in FY2019/20. The increase in livestock vaccine purchases resulted in the reduction of the number of districts with Foot and Mouth disease from 54 in 2018/19 to 31 in FY 2019/20 (NDR, 2021).

73. Breeding and genetic development continued at *NAGRC & DB* stations and involved conservation and multiplication of beef and dairy cattle, goats, pigs and poultry breeds. The poor institutional performance of *NAGRC & DB* was attributed to the increased animal death due to weather related catastrophes, shortage of pasture due to land grabbing and encroachment, low staffing levels to carry out community breeding, loss of animals due to lack of a governing board to authorise disposal of old, blind, lame or non-productive animals and the donation of animals for festive seasons and public events. During the FY 2019/20, the lack of a governing board at *NAGRC & DB* delayed the renewal of expired contracts for 22 key staff (including farm managers, head of human resource, audit, and procurement), staff infighting and dissatisfaction led to stalled implementation and supervision of planned activities (MoFPED, 2020f).

74. In addition, the state of the ranches like Aswa, Rubona stock farm and Ruhengere Field Station (Maruzi, and Nshaara) was appalling (Parliament of Uganda, 2018).

- a) Aswa Ranch, Pader District was mandated to breed and conserve Ankole, Boran and Zebu Cattle. A modest increase (183) in the animal herd was realised from 2,093 cattle on 1st July 2019 to 2494 cattle on 30th June 2020. The growth of animal herds and the breeding programme were negatively affected by lack of: paddocking and fencing, clear physical land boundaries and land titles, tractors, inadequate good quality pastures and long distances to water sources. The major challenge faced by the Ranch was land encroachment due to poor surveying and demarcation to the effect that 10 square miles of land had been encroached on by Banuti Ranchers since 2016.
- b) Rubona Stock Farm, Bunyangabo District, registered a small growth (16) in cattle herds from 496 animals on 1st July 2019 to 512 animals on 30th June 2020 and a negative growth (-16) for the goat herd from 191 to 175 animals during the same period. The key challenges to the breeding programme included poor animal nutrition due to lack of funds to clear bushes to plant quality pastures, understaffing and inadequate staff accommodation.
- c) Ruhengere Field Station, Kiruhura District, the cattle herd grew by a net of 312 animals from 3,572 on 1st July 2019 to 3,884 on 30th June 2020. The goat herd increased from 1590 to 1786 animals during the same period, however, there was a high goat mortality (441) due to inadequate housing, poor quality pastures and high prevalence of diseases. A key challenge was land encroachment and parcelling of ranch land to other users. Out of 21 square miles of the ranch, 10 square miles were allocated to the army, 2 square miles were occupied by a private developer and the matter was before Courts of Law (MoFPED, 2020f).

75. *National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO)* remained underfunded and operated using donor funds even for paying salaries. Depending on donors for funding made it difficult for NARO to engage in disinterested research. NARO's annual budget for FY 2019/20 was UGX 79.661 billion against a budget release of UGX 57.102 billion of from Government. In addition, during FY 2019/20, NARO implemented 116 off-budget projects supported by development

partners to a tune of UGX 41.173 bn. The funds were required to finance ongoing research on technology generation, revamp the dilapidated laboratory infrastructure to improve the working environment of scientists; reduce the projected staff turnover and secure NARO land from encroachers. Some of NARO land was grabbed across the country that affected its activities and farmers did not utilize many technologies developed by NARO.

76. NARO recorded cumulative research output by the end of the FY 2019/20. Six maize seed varieties and seven hybrid rice varieties were released. Research in the development of the African swine fever disease virus was initiated with the development of the soft tick colony. Through goat improvement schemes, 34 breeding bucks with a six-month attainable weight of 15 kg and a twinning rate of 50% were selected and exchanged among breeding groups in Hoima District. Four stingless bee species were identified to improve pollination, ecology and for use in the food and pharmaceutical industries (NDR, 2021).
77. The LGs had the responsibility for all decentralised services in the production including crop, animals and fisheries husbandry extension services, entomological services and vermin control. The services were budgeted for under one programme-District Production Services. The LGs (Districts) received transfers as a sector conditional grant (wage) and sectoral conditional grant (non-wage) that addressed the two sub-programmes-agricultural extension and production.
78. The Department of Agricultural Extension and Skills Management (DAES), following the National Agricultural Extension Policy (NAES) and 2016 National Agricultural Extension Strategy (NAES) was mandated to support and guide LGs in planning and budgeting for extension services, set standards for service delivery, provided agricultural production information to MAAIF and monitored and evaluated agricultural extension services in order to strengthen accountability and transparency in agricultural extension service delivery (MoFPED, 2020f).
79. The MAAIF had planned to recruit 1,968 extension workers at Districts and Sub-counties to achieve the target of 5,000 extension workers to provide extension services to farmers. There was inadequate agricultural extension services across the country mainly attributed to the low extension services worker to farmer ratio of 1:1800 against the recommended ratio of 1:500. The staffing level of the extension staff, however, increased to 70.6% in the FY 2019/20 from 67.8% in FY2018/19 that strictly improved the ratio of extension staff to farming households from 1:1800 to 1:1730 (NDR, 2021). The inadequate agricultural extension services undermined the role of extension services leading to poor/low yields and hence making agriculture less productive.
80. The major achievement for MAAIF was to revive the single spine extension services institutional framework at sub-county and district levels. At District level, there was a provision for a District Production Coordinator, a Principal Agricultural Officer, a Principal Veterinary Officer, a Principal Fisheries Officer, a Principal Entomologist and a Senior Agricultural Engineer for Water for Agricultural Production. At the beginning of FY 2015/16, 672 officers were required at District Level, of which 77 were available. There was a staffing gap of 595, who required annual wage of UGX 12,111,268,476.

81. At Sub county level, the new structure provided for a Veterinary Officer, an Agriculture Officer and a Fisheries Officer. By the beginning of FY 2015/16, 3236 officers were required at Sub county level for implementation of Single spine extension system. There was a staffing gap of 2847 positions, which required UGX 37,222,805,412 in annual salaries. By the time of the terminal evaluation, all the staff required for the single spine across the country were not in place.
82. The terminal evaluation of the NDP II asserted that the lack of coordination often led to unharmonised implementation of guidelines. The semi-autonomy of agencies under MAAIF resulted in high overhead costs and duplication of roles. The UCDA and OWC distributed coffee seedlings under different and or parallel institutional frameworks. The terminal evaluation asserted that coordination between MAAIF and its semi-autonomous public agencies was required to ensure their optimal functionality and delivery of required services.

4.4 Institutional Framework for Tourism

83. Tourism was one of the world's largest and most dynamics economic sectors and provided employment opportunities, foreign exchange and international recognition. Uganda had diverse and abundant wildlife and national resources. Tourism was the second key growth opportunity (KGO2) under NDP II. Tourism was one of the three growth areas that contributed towards the 6.3 percent economic growth rate envisaged in the NDPII. The sector contributed to employment creation since Uganda aspired to be a top ten long haul tourist destination offering a high end, diverse and distinctive visitor experiences.
84. The Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities (MoTWA) was the lead ministry with the responsibility of *"formulating and implementing policies, strategies, plans and programmes that promote tourism, wildlife and cultural heritage conservation for socio-economic development and transformation of the country"*. Under NDP II, the Sector planned to achieve its targets through aggressive promotion and marketing of Uganda to unlock its tourism potential, diversifying tourism product range, improving tourism and hospitality skills along the tourism value chain and strengthening conservation of natural and cultural heritage assets. The interventions aimed to increase Uganda's attractiveness as a preferred tourism destination.
85. The Presidential Investors Round Table chaired by H.E the President was instrumental in mainstreaming constructive advices on how Uganda would become an attractive tourist destination during the NDP II period. Specifically, there was review and revision of visa fees to encourage tourism as well as a public relations drive to market Uganda in the international arena for instance through trade fairs (Roberts and Sejjaaka, 2017).
86. Under the MoTWA there were four public agencies. The Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), established by the Uganda Wildlife Act, 2019 was responsible for managing wildlife resources in and outside protected areas. The Uganda Hotel and Tourism Training Institute (UHTTI), Jinja, established by the Uganda Hotel and Tourism Training Institute Act of 2015 was responsible for training human resource for tourism and hospitality sector. The Uganda Wildlife Research and Training Institute (UWRTI), Kasese, established by the Uganda Wildlife Research and Training Institute Act, 2016 was responsible for undertaking wildlife research and training human resources for the wildlife sector while the Uganda Wildlife Conservation Education Center (UWEC)

established by the Uganda Wildlife Conservation Education Act 2015, was responsible for conservation education and awareness throughout the country.

87. The MoTWA and its public agencies worked closely with other Government MDAs and the non-Government actors including the private sector through their umbrella associations and the civil society. The private sector actors were organised in associations for self-regulation and collective bargaining power directed towards attractive public policies and incentives. The private sector associations included: (i) the umbrella Uganda Tourism Association (UTA); (ii) Uganda Hotels Owners Association (UHOA); (iii) Uganda Tour Guides Association (UTGA); and (iv) The Uganda Association of Travel Agents (TUGATA). The associations, however, remained weak due to capacity challenges and lack of cohesiveness (MoTWA, 2018).
88. The number of tourist arrivals increased from 1,402,409 in 2017 to 1,542,620 in 2019 (by 9.9%). The tourist arrivals earned Uganda USD 1.59 trillion in 2019 compared to USD 1.45 billion in 2017. Fifty two percent of the tourists to Uganda came from African Countries while 20% were from Europe and 14% from North America. The increment in tourist arrivals was attributed to an increase in leisure tourists from 21% in 2012 to 25% in 2019 (89,000 to 126,000 tourists).
89. During the FY 2019/20, the UWEC hosted 285,792 domestic visitors/tourists against the annual target of 358,200. The number included 210,845 students/pupils from 2,799 schools. Through the outreach program, 120 schools were reached. Through the community Conservation Education program, UWEC covered the four regions (Central, Eastern, Northern and Western) and reached out to 60,000 people (NDR, 2021).
90. In terms of human capital development, during the FY 2019/20 tourist and wildlife training institutes performed as follows: (i) 164 students (57% female) enrolled at UHTTI and 228 (69% females) graduated and (ii) 162 students enrolled at UWRTI (68 female) and 72 graduated with Diplomas and Certificates (NDR, 2021). The above figures were indicative of the low capacity of the institutes to produce the required human resources amidst undertones of being poorly equipped. The dominance of females in both the training institutes and the employment domain was implied. There were also undertones that foreigners at managerial levels dominated the hotel and tourism sub-sectors. A number of universities offered a Bachelors of Tourism and Hotel Management, which provided room for academic progression and was a source for teaching and management staff for the sector.
91. Natural and cultural heritage sites were conserved. During the FY2019/20, the titling processes of the following sites was ongoing: Bukaleba, Bishop Hannington, Nakayiima and Mawuuta hills. Mapping for Mutanda was completed and consultation and engagements were held to secure a land title for it. Boundaries were opened and marked with visible pegs at Bigo bya Mugenyi and Nakayima cultural heritage sites. Blue print for the Kabale Museum was produced. The Sites and Museums of Kabale, Wedelai, Soroti, Fort Lugard, Bweyore, Dolwe, Partiko, Nyero, Kapir, Mukongoro and Moroto were maintained and cleaned. Exhibits well curated and fumigated (NDR, 2021).
92. The sector faced a number of challenges. Land for some historical/heritage sites was not titled due inadequate budgets to secure the land titles. The country had 650 cultural sites of which only 14 sites of the 150 national sites had land titles. Disease outbreaks like Ebola and Marburg and terrorism threats negatively affected the sector. Lack of electricity in the tourism sites especially those in the national parks increased operational costs as well as the cost of the destination. The increased cases

of human wildlife conflicts and encroachments drove wildlife animals out of the parks, which resulted in the need for trench digging and establishment of beehives.

93. Inadequate financial allocations to the sector led to: (i) inadequate marketing, promotion and publicity of the country's tourist attractions, low levels of product development to keep the tourists much longer for them to spend more, (ii) inadequate staffing (at 58% across MDAs) and skills acquisition, (iii) weak linkages with the lower local governments in the management and utilization of wildlife resources.

94. Whereas the LG structure provided for Tourism and Wildlife Officers, it was only Kisoro, Kampala and Jinja that had Tourism Officers. Relatedly, the limited facilities, equipment and inadequacies hampered the performance of training institutes (UHTTI and UWRTI). Uganda had only 14 approved East African trained and certified assessors to classify and grade tourism facilities. Some of the assessors were not Government employees and often failed to engage in activities when scheduled.

4.5. Institutional Framework for Minerals, Oil and Gas

95. The Public institutions in the sector included: Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources- the lead agency, MoFPED, BoU, URA, NEMA, UIA, and PPDA.

96. Oil, gas and mineral resource wealth among developing countries accounted for a large share of GDP, export earnings, Government revenues and formal jobs. Its potential for economic and social transformation was evident for any country capable of harnessing it. Countries easily transitioned from poverty to at least middle-income status. Citizens enjoyed better quality of life along other associated benefits such as: a balanced budget, a reduction in foreign debt, savings and an opportunity to develop new industries if they were successful in avoiding the oil curse (Cameron and Stanley, 2017) which according to Barma, Kaiser and Vinuela (2012) also had an institutional dimension.

97. The quality of institutions or governance was more instrumental in cultivating economic growth than the availability of resources per se (Schubert, 2006). Relatedly, the hesitation by oil states to build strong institutions was premised on the fact that strong institutions demanded higher accountability. For Uganda to take full advantage of its oil resources and avoid the oil curse and or the Dutch Disease as well as become one of Africa's oil success stories, there was need to strengthen its oil governance institutions and become more transparent and accountable in the way it managed its emerging oil industry.

98. By the end of 2017/2018, Uganda had 21 oil and gas discoveries with an estimated accumulation of 6.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent, of which 1.3 billion barrels was recoverable (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development [MEMD], 2018). Uganda's gas reserves were: 672 billion cubic feet of gas, with 499 billion barrels of non-associated gas and 173 bn barrels of associated gas (MEMD, 2017). NDP2 therefore prioritized the exploration of an estimated resource of 6.5 billion barrels of oil with a recoverable potential of 1.4 billion barrels.

99. Article 244 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda vested the ownership and control of all the natural resources in the Government that held them in trust of its citizens. The primary framework that guided the management of oil resources in Uganda was the National Oil and Gas Policy (NOGP, 2008) (MEMD, 2017) whose major objective was the ‘development of institutions, including legislation and manpower necessary for effective management and regulation of the sub-sector.
100. The National Oil and Gas Policy, 2008 provided for the establishment of: (i) the Petroleum Authority of Uganda to handle the regulatory functions; (ii) the National Oil Company to handle the commercial interest of the state and (iii) the Directorate of Petroleum to advise on policy issues and resource management.
101. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda mandated the Parliament to provide the oversight role in the management and exploitation of natural resources. The Parliament of Uganda was hence, the apex institution mandated to make laws for the regulation, management and exploitation of the minerals and natural resources such as oil and gas as well as the sharing of royalties arising from petroleum exploitation and other related activities.
102. The legal regime in Uganda was, however, weak compared to other countries (like Liberia or Egypt) where all international agreements or investment contracts were effected only after parliamentary approval and or ratification. The Minister of Energy and Mineral Development negotiated and entered into petroleum agreements (Section 9 of the Upstream Act and Section 8 of the Midstream Act) and did not require parliamentary approval. There was no oversight role of Parliament during the negotiation and contracting process despite the existence of a National Resources Committee of Parliament.
103. The Directorate of Petroleum faced staff capacity issues because Government was slow in developing and skilling as well as retaining the human resources for the sector or directorate. Inadequate funding further constrained the Directorate to function optimally (MEMD, 2016). Relatedly, the mining sector/Mines Department was inadequately funded, equipped and staffed to meaningfully undertake due diligence to ensure compliance with the Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) requirements of the International Conference on Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT

104. The second strategic objectives of NDP2 prioritised investments in what was termed the first “fundamental,” namely, Infrastructural Development. NDP2 flagshiped infrastructure- focusing on four sub-sectors, namely, transport; energy; ICT; and water for production.

4.6 Institutional Framework for Transport Infrastructural Development

105. The Ministry of Works and Transport (MoWT) supervised the transport agencies, monitored, and evaluated the execution of the Sector policies, plans and programs for efficient works, public transport, physical infrastructure and services.

106. The Works and Transport Sector Working Group (WTSWG) oversaw the processes of planning, coordinating, monitoring and reviewing the performance of the Sector. The Policy and

Planning Department of MoWT was the Secretariat to the WTSWG. The Minister chaired a Top Management Team whose membership included Ministers of State, the Permanent Secretary, Directors from the MoWT and its attendant public agencies. The Policy and planning unit housed the Secretariat for the Sector. As part of its M & E system, the MoWT established a comprehensive Transport Sector Data Management System (TSDMS) for performance monitoring and evaluation. The Sector M & E Committee reported to the SWG on a regular basis.

107. The WTSWG was, however, incomplete and there were no Technical Working Groups to scrutinize issues presented to the main SWG. The Annual Sector Performance Report, FY 2018/19 of September 2019 for instance did not capture the contribution of the SWG. The monthly meetings of the SWG were technical and biased towards the lead agency (MoWT) hence the low turn up by the Chief Executives of the Agencies and non-state actors.

108. The private sector was not represented on the WTSWG yet Uganda pursued a private sector-led economy. The CSOs were represented but complained of their limited involvement in procurement, contract negotiation, the budgeting process, donor conferences, capacity building, and technical evaluation of works as well as engagement in the design agenda for the soft policy issues like disability responsive infrastructure and services.

109. The Development Partners were concerned that long-standing policy issues such as adequate resources for road maintenance, progress on axle load controls and improved inter-modal transport planning that were raised at annual review meetings had not been given due attention by the Government during the NDP II period.

110. Regarding transport infrastructure, the NDP2 prioritized development of Standard-Gauge Railway (SGR); upgrade of strategic national roads from 3,795km to 5,295km to support Tourism (KGO2), exploitation of minerals, oil and gas (KGO3) and decongestion of cities. Further efforts were geared toward increasing the volume of passengers and cargo using marine transport.

111. Road transport was the most dominant mode carrying 96.5 % and 95 % of freight cargo and passenger traffic, respectively. As at 2019, the Country had a total road network of 159,364 km, which comprised of 20,854 km of National Roads; 38,603 km of District Roads; 19,959km of Urban Roads and 79,947 km of Community Access Roads. Overall, only 6,107km (3.83%) were paved and for district, roads only 106.5 km (0.28%) were paved while for urban roads, 1229.7 km (6.16%) were paved. The underperformance was attributed to the lengthy and cumbersome procurement processes as well as outright corruption. The Judicial Commission on Land for instance revealed that UNRA lost UGSHS 4 trillion through corruption (MoFPED, 2020a).

112. There was significant progress towards the operationalization of SGR Project. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) and the Project signed an MoU such that all the foreigners or personnel entering the country would strictly be those required for SGR construction and would comply with the local content approved guidelines. The MoIA/Project signed an MoU with the Engineers Registration Board (ERB) to certify all engineers, technicians and technologists to work on the Project. The Directorate of Geological Survey and Mines (DGSM), carried out a mineralogy assessment study aimed at ensuring that the railway would not traverse areas with high mineral potential which could require future diversion of the railway. The Project/ DGSM carried out a geo-

hazard assessment aimed at assuring the financier that mudslides, floods or geological catastrophes will not affect the railway. The Project and UETCL carried out survey and design that would assist in the extension of electricity from UETCL 132kV lines (60KM) to the five planned railway traction substations (Tororo, Buwoola, Iganga, Nyenga and Namanve). A number of other pre-construction activities were ongoing including compensation to land owners.

113. There were cases where public agencies acted as both implementers and regulators. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was the regulator and operational authority over Entebbe International Airport and other airfields. Uganda Railways Cooperation (URC) was responsible for regulation and oversight of the rail sub-sector as well as management of railway stock and assets and management of inland water ports (IWPs). Such instances could easily lead to conflict of interest and micromanagement as well as underperformance and should be discouraged.

114. The Sector faced a number of challenges. Development Partners investment and support was biased towards the construction area while the Railway, Water and Air transport sub-sectors were inadequately funded yet a Multi Model transport approach was the preferred model where all areas would be developed simultaneously. There was marvellous road development but less maintenance primarily funded by Government. The SWG therefore had to continue engaging the MoFPED to scale up road maintenance financing to at least 50% of the required budget. The irregular attendance of SWG meetings by the Chief Executive Officers of Agencies not only delayed the decision-making processes but also sent undesirable signals to DPs that heavily funded the activities of the sector.

115. Underperformance of UNRA during the NDP II was majorly attributed to: delayed land acquisition on upgrading projects, issuance of final designs especially on design and build contracts and delayed payment to service providers that attracted claims in form of interests and low productivity of the local content sub-contractors for the 30% physical works due to their weak financial and technical capacities (MoFPED, 2020a).

4.7 Institutional Framework for Energy Infrastructural Development

116. Up to 1999, the Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) had enjoyed the monopoly in electricity generation, transmission and distribution including rural electrification. The Electricity Act, 1999 provided for the establishment of the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) and the UEB was unbundled to create the Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited (UEGCL), Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited (UETCL) and Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited (UEDCL), respectively (MEMD, 2002).

117. The MEMD was the lead agency in the energy sub-sector supported by eleven agencies whose role was largely in implementation and regulation of the sector programs and activities. The MEMD was responsible for provision of policy guidance in the sustainable development and exploitation of the Energy and Mineral resources, and creation of an enabling environment to attract investment.

118. The eleven agencies were: Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA); Uganda Electricity Generation Company Ltd (UEGCL); Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Ltd (UETCL); Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Ltd (UEDCL); Rural Electrification Agency (REA); Electricity Disputes

Tribunal (EDT), Atomic Energy Council (AEC), Kilembe Mines Ltd, Uganda National Oil Company Ltd (UNOC), Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU), Uganda Energy Credit and Capitalization Company (UECCC).

119. The other agencies that specifically had stake in the implementation of the EMDSDP of 2015 included Uganda Energy Credit Capitalisation Company Limited; Eskom Uganda Limited which operated UEGCL's Nalubaale-Kiira Power Complex under a concession agreement; Independent Power Producers such as Bujagali Energy Limited (BEL) which managed Bujagali Hydro Power Station; Electromaxx; Jacobsen; and Tronder Energy; Concessionaires such as Ferdsult Engineering Services Ltd; West Nile Rural Electrification Company (WENRECO); Bundibugyo Electricity Cooperative Society (BECS); Pader Abim Cooperative Society (PAMECS); Kilembe Investments Ltd (KIL) that distributed and managed different rural power schemes; Umeme Limited and International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA).

120. The NDP2 focused on exploitation of the abundant renewable energy sources (RES) which included hydro and geothermal power that was to be increased from 825 MW in 2012 to 2,500 MW by 2020. The NDP2 further focused on the expansion of the national electricity grid network and promotion of energy efficiency and the use of alternative sources of energy.

121. The sector made significant progress towards achieving the NDP II targets. Four additional small hydropower projects were commissioned namely Sindila, Siti 2, Kyambura and Ndugutu, which added over 35 MW in installed capacity and an estimated annual generation of 162 GWh to the Ugandan National Grid. Fourteen of the 17 projects in the portfolio were operational at the end of 2019, which represented 122 MW (77 %) of the targeted 158 MW of installed capacity.

122. The transmission network grew by 13% to the current footprint of 2,989Kms as at end of Q1 2020. The increment was largely from commissioning of the Kawanda-Kapeeka 132kV 52km T-line and energizing of the Opuyo – Lira section of the Tororo- Lira T-line. That was a representation of 1,008Km of 220kV rating and 1,946Km of 132kV rating.

123. Rural Electrification was expected to grow by 5% annually that would have resulted in an access target of 33% by the end of FY 2019/20. Under the free connections initiative, 154, 198 households had been connected to the national grid by 30th June 2020 (MoFPED, 2020d). The national distribution network expanded as 2,550Km of Medium Voltage lines and 2,596Km of Low Voltage Lines were completed. Government was fast-tracking rural electrification through electrification of all 570 Sub-counties to accelerate access and contribute to demand growth.

124. The sector faced challenges that included: (i) the lack of adequate and reliable power was consistently cited in private-sector surveys as being among the top constraints on Uganda's economic growth, (ii) During the FY 2017/18, Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) validation survey of 144,471 Yaka metres indicated that 35% of industrial metres and 15% domestic metres were inaccurate, (iii) there was inadequate staffing levels as well as high staff attrition rates in key areas, budgetary constraints and lack of appropriate curricula in energy studies at institutions of higher learning, (iv) difficulty in acquisition of Right of Way slowed progress of works on transmission line projects, (v) the COVID-19 negative impacts included slowed project implementation, reduced electricity demand and low revenue collection

as well as reduced rate of new connections and (vi) high occurrence of vandalism was common on rural electrification projects in Eastern Uganda and on transmission projects in Eastern and Central Uganda (MoFPED, 2020d).

4.8. Institutional Framework for ICT Infrastructural Development

125. The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector comprised of two major public actors, Ministry of ICT and National Guidance (MoICT & NG) and the National Information Technology Authority (NITA-U). The other public actors under the ICT sector were: UCC, UMC, UBC, NVPPC, UTL, UICT, MST and NCST. The NDP2 aimed to extend the National Backbone Infrastructure (NBI) and the construction of ICT incubation hubs and ICT parks..

126. During the FY2019/20 NITA-U made significant achievements. An additional 920kms of Optical Fibre cable were laid accumulatively bringing the total number of kilometres laid to 3,394kms. Ten (10) more districts were covered by the NBI which brought the total number of districts on the NBI to forty nine (49). 169 new MDA/LG sites were connected to the NBI bring the total number of sites connected to the NBI to 597 during the FY 2019/20 compared to 96 additional sites in FY2018/19. The services provided included Internet Bandwidth, Data Centre hosting and Integrated Financial Management (IFMS).

127. During the FY 2019 the NBI covered 49 Districts but connectivity was also extended to four additional border posts which meant that a total of nine (9) major posts with neighbouring countries : Kenya (Busia and Malaba), Rwanda at Katuna, Tanzania at Mutukula, Sudan (Elegu and Oraba) and DRC (Mpodwe, Goli and Vurra) had been connected. In addition, seven transmission stations were constructed in Nebbi, Koboko, Karuma, Arua, Moyo, Moroto and Mpodwe bringing the total number of NBI transmission stations to thirty two (32).

128. Web presence for Lower Governments was enhanced during the FY 2019/20. A total of 29 new websites were developed and six websites redeveloped bring the total number to 35. Three hundred and eighty eight (388) websites were hosted and obtained technical support from NITA-U. In addition, 37 technical individuals from selected Districts were trained on content and technical skills in Drupal and Word press⁴. 41 IT officers were trained on creation of Google Analytics⁵ (MoFPED, 2020d).

129. Regarding e-government⁶, the government setup the infrastructure and promoted the roll out of e-services in the following aspects MYUG free Wi-Fi service, 284 Wi-Fi sites were located across the central business district of Kampala and areas of Entebbe with 5,985,548 average monthly user login sessions. A Government Cloud infrastructure (National Data Centre) and a Disaster Recovery (DR) site were established and MDAS hosted 123 applications in the National Data Centre in the FY 2019/20 compared to 40 in FY2018/19.

⁴ Drupal and word press are content management systems/software used by individual with basic IT skills to manage their websites.

⁵ How to optimize traffic on webpage.

⁶ E-Government enables citizens, enterprises and organizations to carry out their business with government in a more efficient, transparent, and effective manner.

130. Five additional new e-services were developed to aid the smooth operation of entities: Anti-Corruption Reporting Service, Uganda Wildlife Education Centre payments portal, Uganda Museum payments portal, Uganda Hotel and Tourism Training Institute Hotel management system and an online registration system for membership for Uganda Chamber of Commerce were developed. The SMS gateway provided a platform for dispatch of SMS in bulk by MDAs at affordable prices.

131. In addition, the Subscribers accessed Government services through *260#. Relatedly, smartphones and feature phones were the drivers of new mobile internet subscriptions and grew from 21.5 million smartphones and feature phones in FY2018/19 to 24.1million in FY2019/20. There was, however, a decline of 4% in telephone penetration per 100 subscribers from 63.6 in FY2018/19 to 61.0 in FY 2019/20. The decline was largely due to the suppression of new demand because of the national COVID 19 lockdowns and its subsequent effects on spending patterns. Retail store closures across the country further prevented on boarding of new customers to networks (NITA-U, 2020).

4.9. Institutional Framework for Water-for-Production Infrastructural Development

132. Policy makers in sub-Saharan African (SSA) identified irrigation as a key ingredient to boosting food security and income as well as a precursor for agricultural commercialisation. Most SSA countries have, however, not fully exploited their irrigation potential. Globally Water for Production accounted for over 80% of water withdrawn for use. Irrigated land produced 40% of global food (IFAD, 2015). Uganda has one the highest irrigation potentials in the world with over 15% (37,000 sq. km out of the total area of 241,559 sq. km) of her surface area covered by fresh water resources. Uganda's ratio of cultivated area under irrigation to the irrigation potential was only 0.5% compared to 3.6% for Tanzania, 2.0% for Kenya and 1.6% for Burundi.

133. The NDP2 underlined the importance of the infrastructure for water for production towards commercial agriculture and industrial activities. The Government targeted the construction of large and small-scale water schemes for irrigation, livestock and rural industries.

134. The Government enacted the National Irrigation Policy, 2017 to direct the implementation of irrigation interventions to ensure optimal use of available land and water resources for agricultural production and productivity to contribute effectively towards food security, wealth and employment creation as well as export promotion.

135. At national level, policy implementation was monitored by OPM, MAAIF, MWE, MoFPED, Local Governments and other stakeholders at appropriate levels as was guided by the National Monitoring and Evaluation Policy. The OPM Chaired the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC) and reported to the Implementation Coordination Steering Committee (ICSC) on any outstanding issues related to Water for Production (WfP).

136. At the Ministerial level, the mandate for WfP facilities was shared between MWE, MAAIF and Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives (MTIC). MWE was responsible for "off-farm" activities, while Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) was responsible for "on-farm" activities. "off-farm" referred to development of water sources and transmission (bulk

transfer to farm gates) and “on-farm” referred to irrigation infrastructure, water use and management. MTIC was responsible for facilities for wildlife and recreation in gazetted areas.

137. The National Irrigation Policy, 2017 was therefore implemented under a multi-sectoral, multi-dimensional approach with cohesive implementation arrangement of various stakeholders whose roles and responsibilities were elaborated. Despite the innocent demarcation of roles based on “off-farm” activities and “on-farm” activities there was conflict between MWE and MAAIF over the lead role in development of WfP. As result irrigation initiatives in the water sector were not well coordinated with technical input from the agriculture sector and vice versa (Roberts and Sejjaka, 2017).

138. At District level, a district technical support committee was set up whose membership included the District engineer, water officer, forest officer, the heads of production and marketing, the agriculture officer and community development officers (all together 12 persons). District and Sub-country officials worked with extension workers and the District Planner to generate performance data at the sub-county levels, aggregated the data before submission to MAAIF & MWE, and appropriately packaged to improve performance. Heads of water office coordinated with their respective line ministries to support planning, implementation, monitoring and management of irrigation in their respective districts. MAAIF worked through the Directorate of Agriculture Extension Services and their posted staff at the sub-county to support farmer uptake of irrigation opportunities where appropriate.

139. A Coordination Committee established at sub-county level, included sub-county officials, councillors and Farmers’ Coordination Committee together with the other sub-county and district technical team facilities. The approach addressed the operation & maintenance and functionality challenges that were associated with the community-managed facilities and technical staff who worked with private farmers to ensure sustainability of the constructed facilities.

140. Irrigation Schemes were categorized into four types:- Micro Scale Irrigation Schemes with less than 5 hectares; Small Scale Irrigation Schemes with 5-100 hectares, Medium Scale Irrigation Schemes with 100-1,000 hectares and Large Scale Irrigation Schemes with greater than 1,000 hectares of irrigated land. Government undertook to invest in large and medium irrigation schemes through public investments and public private partnerships for micro irrigation schemes. Government supported progressive farmers and organized farmer groups through a targeted subsidy. Investment in irrigation infrastructures was premised on the assertion that well managed irrigation schemes mitigated effects of climate change or prolonged droughts and increased yields by 2-5 times for most crops (Nation Irrigation Policy, 2017).

141. The WfP made great strides in providing water supply of reliable quantity and quality for multipurpose uses thereby increasing the overall crop, livestock, wildlife and fish production. By 2022, the total number of registered WfP facilities was 1,316, including 1,228 valley tanks, 35 earth dams, 4 medium scale irrigation schemes and 49 small-scale irrigation systems in 121 districts. Twenty eight percent (28%) of the total WfP facilities were private facilities constructed with GoU-support (MWE, 2022).

142. Government undertook to invest in public private partnership mechanisms for irrigation development in order to unlock constraints related to private sector agricultural financing, which was consistent with the need for transformation of the 68% subsistence farmers. Implementation of the national irrigation policy was critical to improving farm productivity and contributing immensely to household incomes as a driver towards attainment of the anticipated middle-income status by 2020.
143. MWE constructed small-scale irrigation schemes with Government funding and medium scale irrigation schemes under the Farm Income Enhancement and Forestry Conservation (FIEFOC) Project II. MWE operated and managed earth-moving equipment for construction of valley tanks and hired out equipment to individual farmers at subsidized rates. The MWE played an important role of technical support to LGs and line ministries such as MAAIF (MWE, 2020).
144. WfP facilities were managed according to ownership and facility category. Management of the WfP facilities was by private operators for individual facilities, communal management for dams and valley tanks (Water User Committees, Water Associations and Farmer Field Schools) and cooperative societies for the case of medium and large-scale Irrigation schemes. Out of 1,391, four hundred and ninety one (491) facilities were under community management system with established Water User Committees. The 402 valley tanks under Community Based Maintenance System (CBMS) had established Water User Committees (WUCs) of which 354 (88%) were fully functional. 35 dams were constructed from 2000-2020, all of them under CBMS and 25 Water User Committees (71%) were fully functional as of June 2020.
145. MWE formed Water User Associations/Farmer Field Schools (FFS) to enhance and promote self-driven approaches for community ownership and sustainability initiatives. MWE supported the Local Governments to train the beneficiaries together with the management committees to ensure functionality of Water User Committees/FFS.
146. During FY 2019/20, MWE under Water for Production Department started the construction of small-scale solar powered irrigation systems. Six (06) medium scale irrigation schemes of Doho II, Ngenge, Wadelai, Tochi, Mubuku II and Rwengaaju in the Districts of Butaleja, Kween, Pakwach, Oyam, Kasese and Kabarole, respectively were constructed. One (1) small-scale Irrigation scheme in the District of Nakaseke was completed. The Department created more irrigable land of 147ha (363 acres) that increased Uganda's farm land under irrigation from 15,250ha to 15,270ha (MWE, 2020).
147. The World Bank supported MAAIF and 40 LGs through the Micro-scale irrigation program as part of the Uganda Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers Program for Results (UgIFT) to boost LGs service among other things the delivery in micro irrigation. The Micro-scale Irrigation Program helped farmers to buy irrigation equipment at a lower cost, taught them how to use & maintain the irrigation equipment and when & how to water their crops. Government subsidies reduced the cost of equipment and paid between 25% and 75% of farmers' irrigation equipment, which included a pump to take water from a nearby stream or a hose to distribute the water in the plot. The Program benefited mainly smallholder farmers as support was capped to one hectare (2.5 acres) per farmer. In addition, the program funded awareness-raising activities that helped farmers understand how irrigation could improve productivity and help them earn a decent income.

148. The total volume added through investments by MWE in the FY 2019/20 (including facilities constructed by the Districts and private farmers using WfP Construction Equipment) was 901,000M³. By the end of FY 2019/2020, cumulative WfP storage had increased from 41.124 million cubic meters in FY 2018/2019, to 42.025 million cubic meters. Seven solar powered irrigation systems at Zonal Agricultural Research and Development Institutes (ZARDIs) were undertaken while 14 sites with solar water pumping systems in Ntungamo, Hoima, Mubende, Kamuli, Koboko, Kumi, Kabale, Mukono, Kiboga, Buvuma, Sembabule, Kayunga and Yumbe districts were installed. About 28.2% of the farmers accessed water for production during the FY 2019/20 (NDR, 2021).

149. Functionality was assessed for all facilities constructed during the period, 2000- 2020. The functionality rate for WfP facilities was estimated at 87.8% (included the newly constructed facilities) in FY 2019/20. During FY2019/20, MWE worked towards improving functionality status for the partially functional facilities through installation of abstraction systems, formation and rejuvenation of management structures, refreshment of by-laws and training of stakeholders.

150. Irrigation development in Uganda was slow compared to other countries in the East African region like Kenya and Tanzania. The major constraints to irrigation development in Uganda were clustered under inadequate national irrigation capacity and economic aspects of irrigation, inadequate access to water for irrigation as well as unfavourable land tenure systems and management. Uganda lacked highly skilled irrigation personnel focused on irrigation, especially technicians to operate and maintain irrigation systems, because of the absence of irrigation courses at technical institutions.

151. There was a lack of streamlined extension structures to coordinate and provide advisory services and technical backstopping on irrigation to farmers from the local level to the national level. Irrigation did not make economic sense to most farmers because of low returns from farming. In addition to physical water scarcity in times of need, in other areas farmers could not abstract the water and deliver it to their farms because of the high operation costs of conventional pumps that relied on fuel and or electricity. The land tenure systems in Uganda, especially customary tenure, was not clearly defined and it deterred farmers from making long-term investments on land (Wanyama et al, 2017).

152. The terminal evaluation of the NDP II noted that the major institutional framework challenge of water for production was that the National Irrigation Policy, 2017 was silent about informal irrigation practices and made no provisions for its regulation. The majority of informal irrigated areas in Uganda were located on the fringes of swamps mostly in Eastern Uganda around streams flowing into Lake Kyoga. The area under informal irrigation increased from 23,000 ha in 1945 to 53,000 ha in 2005 with focus on irrigating rice, vegetable and fruit production systems (FAO 2015). Urban and Peri-urban informal irrigated agriculture covered a small percentage of the total irrigated area but accounted for between 60 and 100% of the consumed leafy vegetables in the urban areas depending on crop and season.

153. In addition, the WfP sector faced Institutional, Managerial, Operations and Management (O&M) challenges including: (a) inadequate resources, (b) inadequate management structures, (c) poor community participation, (d) inadequate technical capacity, (e) poor construction and supervision of construction, (f) lack of attention to environmental and health concerns, (g) low aquaculture yield due to poor practices, (h) damage of river banks leading to floods, (j) limited interaction between management and water users, (i) limited participation of district officials in management decisions, (j) lack of land ownership by farmers, (k) lack of community contribution to the construction of facilities, (l) failure to maintain infrastructures of the schemes, (m) inadequate water extraction systems and livestock troughs and (n) decline in volume of water leading to low efficiency (MWE, 2022).

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

154. The third strategic objective of NDP2 prioritised investments in yet another “fundamental,” namely, Human Capital Development (HCD). NDP2 stipulated that HCD priority area would, “focus on increasing the stock of a skilled and healthy workforce towards the production of human capital to accelerate the realization of the demographic dividend”.

4.10. Institutional Framework for Access to Health

144. The Ministry of Health was the lead agency and the other public agencies included Aids Commission, Cancer Institute, Heart Institute, National Medical Stores, Health Service Commission, Uganda Blood Transfusion Services (UBTS), Butabika National Referral Mental Hospital, Mulago National Referral Hospital, Virus Research Institute, Regional Referral Hospitals, LG and KCCA Health services and non-state actors, CSOs and Private Sector. The MoH played the role of policy making, providing guidelines, training and capacity building as well as monitoring the health sector and coordination of partners.

145. The Health Policy Advisory Committee (HPAC) executed the functions of the Health SWG. The HPAC was a forum for the Government, health Development Partners and other stakeholders to discuss health related policies and to advise on how best the Health Sector Development Plan (HSDP) was to be implemented. The HPAC reviewed the policies and strategic direction of the Sector. It had representation from other health sector agencies, CSOs, private health providers, and other ministries. The HPAC was chaired by the Permanent Secretary of MoH and was co-chaired by an active Development Partner Group.

~~146.~~ The HPAC was a functional SWG, held monthly meetings and had an active secretariat housed under the Commissioner Policy and Planning. Monthly meetings were scheduled on agreed upon dates and were held regularly over several years. The SWG had a monitoring tool to track attendance and performance against set parameters like the number of policy issues discussed, number of members that attended or were represented at meetings; follow-up actions and percentage of actions from HPAC work plan implemented. Annual sector performance reports were produced by end of September each year for input in the Joint Annual Review (JAR). Actions agreed at the JAR and captured in an Aide Memoire detailed responsible entities, timelines and means of verification.

147. The Health Sector had established coordination mechanisms that required all partners that supported the Sector to sign a compact committing them to a Government-Led Coordination Framework. The arrangement enhanced aid effectiveness and a common results framework linked to the Sector's financial resources, outputs and outcomes.
148. The sector recognized the importance of inter-sector coordination and actively developed partnerships with other sectors such as water on sanitation and hygiene issues. The CSOs and the private sector engaged the HPAC. Effective representation of CSOs on the Technical Working Groups brought more perspectives in service delivery. Analogously, private sector actors such as manufacturers of drugs and owners of private hospitals added value.
149. The success and coherence of the HPAC was attributed to the homogeneity of the sector and consistent support from the development partners. The effectiveness of the HPAC was demonstrated through efficiency in control of cross-border communicable diseases as well as epidemics such as Covid-19, Ebola and Marburg outbreaks.
150. The HPAC faced operational challenges that included: (i) the agenda for the SWG was often too long and some items would be handled at subsequent meetings, which would delay decision-making, (ii) inconsistency in attendance of meetings had a bearing on vibrancy and decision making process, (iii) CSOs were not well represented. Failure to invite new members was attributed to the Secretariat's failure to invite new recommended members and (iv) at national level, health facilities were operating at 89% capacity in terms of human resource and 74% at LG level which was quite restrictive in view of the increasing roles of the MoH.
151. In addition, the declining share of Government budget allocations over the past decade and the fragmented project approach from DPs negatively affected the delivery of adequate and quality services. Development partners were encouraged to work towards joint funding mechanisms to support public health and core services, along with joint reviews and technical support. Multi-annual budgeting could have been improved through realistic projections and information on development partner off-budget funding (Roberts and Seijaaka, 2017).
152. The LGs found it difficult to attract medical doctors to far and hard to reach districts/areas. The chronic lack of basic diagnostic equipment made it difficult for professionals to carry out inspection and support-supervision. Inspection, monitoring and support supervision were virtually non-existent in districts. The proliferation of LGs across the country constrained the role of inspection, monitoring and support supervision. In line with the proposed regional development, there was need to strengthen regional referral hospitals to carry out support supervision in lower health facilities under their jurisdiction. This was consistent with the Ministry of Health Support Supervision Strategy 2019-2024. Amidst undertones against recentralisation of formerly decentralised services, it will be noble decision to recentralise the appointment of District Medical Officers (DMOs).
153. The NDP2 focused on; mass malaria treatment; the National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme; universal access to family planning services (FPSs); health infrastructural development; reducing maternal, neonatal and child morbidity and mortality; scaling up HIV prevention and treatment; and developing a centre of excellence in cancer treatment and related services. Health outcomes were a multi-dimensional responsibility of various institutions and achievement of the desired

sector results depended on the sector's institutional capacity and that of the complementary and support Ministries and agencies.

154. The indicative performance of Health Sector during the FY 2019/20 was highlighted. The fertility rate of 5.4 children per woman was above the NDPII target of 4.5 for FY 2019/20. The life expectancy of 63.3 years was above the NDPII target of 60 years. The population accessing healthcare within a 5 km radius of 86% exceeded the 84% for FY 2019/20 amidst regional disparities. In the Acholi region over 34% of the population travelled more than 5 km to access health services. Deliveries in health facilities decreased from 60 percent in FY2018/19 to 59.6 percent in FY2019/20 and was short of the NDPII target. Births attended by skilled health personnel declined from 65 to 60 percent which was below the NDPII target. The per capita OPD utilization ratio stagnated at 1.1 and was below the NDPII target of 1.5 for the FY2019/20. The average availability of Essential Medicines and Health Supplies (EMHS) increased to 82 percent in FY2019/20 from 60 percent in FY2018/19 (NPA, 2019).
155. In addition, during the FY 2019/20 the sector made significant strides towards achievement of key outcome indicators. Seventy seven percent of sub-counties had functional health centre III against the targeted 81%, immunization for the third dose for Diphtheria, Pertussis (Whooping Cough) and Tetanus (DPT) was 91% against the targeted 97%. Couple years of protection performed at 65% of the target of 4,700,000. However, a total of 57 HCIVs provided Caesarean Section (C/S) services without blood transfusion services! (MoFPED, 2020 b).
156. The institutional setup of the highhanded health-monitoring unit under State House remained unclear within Government. The unit indulged in functions similar to those of the Quality Assurance Department within the MoH. The Quality Assurance Department needed to be facilitated to optimal functionality.
157. The terminal evaluation of the NDP II asserted that the health infrastructure system that ranged from: Health Centre I (VHT); Parish based HCII; Sub-county based (HCIII); County based HCIV; District hospitals (HCV); Regional Referral Hospitals (HCVI) to National Referral Hospitals (HCVII) was a big burden to Government to finance to optimally deliver adequate and health quality services. In line with NDP2, operationalization of the National Health Insurance Scheme was long overdue since it could greatly reduce the burden on government to construct and operate health facilities.

4.11. Institutional Framework for Access to Education

158. The Education Act, 2008 provided the structure of Education under which section 10(1) indicated that there shall be four levels of education, pre-primary education; primary education; post primary education and training; and tertiary and university education.
159. The MoES was the lead ministry in the Education Sector. MoES was supported by public agencies that included: the Education Service Commission (ESC); Uganda National Examination Board (UNEB); Uganda Business and Technical Examination Board (UBTEB); Uganda Allied Health Examination Board; Uganda Nurses and Midwives Examination Board; National Council

for Higher Education (NCHE); National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC); National Council of Sports and Uganda National Commission for UNESCO (UNATCOM).

160. The Top Management Team chaired by the Minister comprised of the State Ministers and the Permanent Secretary. It provided policy assurance and monitoring of the Education Sector Consultative Committee (ESCC) (the SWG). The ESCC was chaired by the Permanent Secretary and was attended by senior technical and operational personnel from the MoES, other line ministries and agencies, development partners, CSOs and private sector. It focused on the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP)/Education Sector Investment Plan (ESIP) and coordinated the working groups below it. The crosscutting working groups included Sector Policy and Management; Monitoring and Evaluation and Budget Sector Working group. The Sub-Sector Working Groups were: Primary; Secondary; Business, Technical and Vocational; Tertiary (Higher Education); Teacher Education; Special Needs Education; Gender Working Group and Physical Education and Sports.
161. The ESCC met monthly while the Sub Sector Working Groups met regularly. Quarterly review meetings were held to assess performance from each department on recurrent and capital expenditure. Sector Annual Review meetings were held and all education stakeholders were invited to participate. The ESSR report, however, did not capture the contribution of the CSOs and the private sector like it did for Development Partners.
162. The ESCC was functional and was the first sector working group that was established when SWAPs were adopted in Uganda. The M&E Sub Sector Working Group and the Sector Policy Management Working Group discussed projects before they were discussed by the ESCC. The ESCC got feedback on service delivery through regular and annual assessment review processes. The Education Sector participated in the national assessment exercise organized by the OPM (MoES, 2017).
163. Under the NDP2, the Education sector focused on; strengthening Early Childhood Development (ECD) with emphasis on early aptitude and talent identification; increasing retention at primary and secondary levels, especially for girls, as well as increasing primary-to-secondary transition; increasing investment in school inspection, reviewing and upgrading of the education curricula.
164. The Education Act (2008) classified pre-school as a largely private undertaking which limited its access due to the relatively high fees and uneven distribution of Early Childhood Development (ECD) centres that was skewed towards urban areas or wealthy communities and central Uganda yet the earliest years of life provided children with the opportunity to grow to their full potential (NPA, 2015). All obstacles to the institutionalisation of ECD needed to be addressed to ensure equitable access.
165. In terms of institutional framework, UPE was a decentralised service with a Directorate at the MoES. At LGs, primary education (both private and public) was coordinated by the District Education Department (DED) headed by the District Education Officer. The DED had a number of inspectors headed by the District Inspector of Schools. The inspection team included Centre Coordinating Tutors (CCTs) based at Core PTCs who served as outreach teacher

educators to provide Continuous Professional Development (CPDs) to primary schools as well as head teachers and teachers. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) was the accounting officer. The District Council was the highest political authority that provided policy direction to primary education.

166. The District Service Commission (DSC) was responsible for advertisement and recruitment of staff for the DED including teachers and head teachers for primary schools. The DED was responsible for delivery of education services. The DED: (i) controlled education standards through support supervision/monitoring and evaluation of pre-primary, primary, secondary, primary teacher colleges, and tertiary institutions and (ii) ensured compliance to Government education policy and the teaching curriculum. It further (iii) ensured rational deployment and management of administrative staff, teachers, and head teachers; (iv) ensured prudent financial management, including disbursement of grants to schools and follow up on accountability; (v) participated in mobilization/sensitization of parents with regard to their roles and responsibilities and (vi) ensured sound school governance (NPA, 2018).
167. The primary completion rate declined from 62% in 2016 to 60% in 2017. The transition rate to S.1 reduced from 65% in 2016 to 61% in 2017. The NDPII targets of 85 % and 83 % for P.7 completion and S.1 transition were not met. The net primary school enrolment rate was 93 % in 2017, which was below the NDPII target of 100 percent. Relatedly, the numbers of Uganda Certificate of Education (UCE) candidates increased from 326,212 in 2017 to 336,740 in 2018 (3.3 %) but the global secondary school enrolments reduced from 1,457,277 in 2016 to 1,370,583 students in 2017. The transition rate to S.5 declined from 30 to 25% from 2016 to 2017, respectively, which was below the NDPII target of 50 percent (NPA, 2019).
168. Primary education provision faced a number of challenges. Many primary schools had not libraries/textbook storage facilities and there was limited quality assurance of supplied teaching materials. There was inadequate community involvement in curriculum implementation (NPA, 2019). In addition, the provision of UPE was marred with dwindling resources, low staffing levels, lack of teachers, discriminatory remunerations, examination malpractices and teacher and pupil absenteeism. The Inspectorate function was over stretched and needed adequate facilitation to function.
169. Secondary education provision in Uganda was both private and public. Secondary Education prepared the students for higher education and the world of work. The secondary education cycle in Uganda lasted six years and consisted of the eighth through 13th years of study, or Senior 1 (S1) to Senior 6 (S6). In 2007, the Government of Uganda introduced its 'Universal Post Primary Education and Training policy', commonly known as Universal Secondary Education (USE) to increase access to secondary education for economically vulnerable families and communities.
170. In terms of institutional framework for secondary education, it was centralised and Government built on the good work of founding religious bodies that owned a number of Government aided secondary schools. The continued involvement of the Parent Teachers Associations (PTA) in running the secondary schools significantly enhanced teachers' motivation through variant

incentive mechanisms. The founding bodies of Government aided secondary schools remained influential. The working relationship between Government and founding bodies needed to be streamlined especially in recruitment of staff including head teachers and admission of students. There were numerous strikes in secondary schools that resulted in loss of properties and lives. The capacity of security organs to investigate such incidences including occasional burning of schools or perceived arsons were not conclusive.

171. The Secondary School Bursars reported directly to MoES and were neither supervised by Sub County Chiefs (same level) nor District Chief Finance Officers yet the audit issues formed part of the District Audit Reports. It was therefore recommended that the Secondary School Bursars should be supervised the Chief Finance officers in their jurisdictions.

172. In terms of institutional framework, higher education (HE) was regulated by the NCHE. The Professional bodies complemented the NCHE since they provided input in Circular development or revision, participated in joint institutional and program accreditation inspections and ensured that their members were up to mark. The professional bodies that regulated the conduct of different professionals cushioned higher education provision.

173. The higher education landscape had both public and private providers: universities, other tertiary institutions and degree awarding non-university institutions. Despite the fact that at university sub-level, the number of private universities were more than the public ones, high education provision was largely public in terms of programs, enrolments, graduate training, research outputs including doctoral graduations and staffing qualifications across levels.

174. The majority of private universities were largely teaching universities with minimal doctoral graduations, graduate enrolments and research outputs. There was tendency for private universities to cherry pick programmes. Most of the students in the university sub-sector were enrolled in humanities as opposed to sciences yet countries needed 40% of university enrolments and or graduations to take off. There were, however, instances where institutions had enrolled students on unaccredited programs or operated without any form of formal accreditation. The NCHE was of view that such incidences were criminal in nature and were not entirely due a weak regulatory framework.

175. During the FY 2019/20, in an attempt to increase access to higher education, the Higher Students Financing Board (HESFB) provided loans to 6,443 students for first and second semesters in various HEIs bringing the cumulative number of beneficiaries to 10,041 since the Board started its mandated activities. The lack of a standard unit cost for programmes across universities made it difficult for HESFB to make financial projections since the Board capped any loan to maximum of Ugx 7m per academic year. Relatedly, the HESFB did not fund higher degrees such as masters and doctorates (MoFPED, 2020c).

176. The SWG faced a number of challenges. The irregular attendance of meetings at Departmental level and Sector Policy Management Sub-Sector Working Groups affected timely execution of issues raised by the ESCC. At the ESCC level the other line ministries irregular attendance of meetings slowed decision making on crosscutting issues. The financing of the Sector Working

Groups remained sticky amidst a declining budget of the MoES, which was suspect for the low attendance of meetings. There was no system of tracking DP off budget support, which made supervision, and monitoring of such funds difficult in relation to sector priorities highlighted in the ESSP. There were undertones of poor quality education provision across levels, which directly affected not only the skill sets but also the employability of education graduates.

177. The Covid-19 pandemic interrupted seamless operation of the sector where students in their final years did not sit for their final examinations. Pupils at ECD level, lower primary level (P.1-P.3) and Senior Two lost a full academic year due Covid-19 lock downs. Many development projects did not receive funds during FY 2019/20 Q3 and Q4 since funds were diverted to other priorities thereby resulting in domestic arrears.
178. Many projects became effective before the necessary preparatory activities were undertaken, leading to loss of implementation time. For Government funded projects, the time lag between planning and actual implementation coupled with piecemeal quarterly releases of funds to projects caused price variations and many projects dragged on for many years without being completed. The planning of Bamunanika T/I, Epel T/I and Kiruhura T/I (now Kazo T/I) happened in 2003, started in FY 2014/15 but had not been completed, FY 2019/20 (MoFPED, 2020c).

4.12. Institutional Framework for Skills Development

179. The MoES through its BTVET function and the Directorate of Industrial Training (DIT) provided policy direction, set skills development standards, coordinated, monitored and regulated curriculum development, licenced training institutions and provided certification as well as accreditation. Other actors that participated in shaping the skills and provision of financial and technical support to the sub-sector included State House, Development Partners, the private sector, Faith Based Organizations, CSOs, training institutions and non-formal training in terms of in-service.
180. In recognition of the importance of its human resources, the Government launched the 'Business, Technical and Vocational Education and Training (BTVET) Strategic Plan 2011-2020 Skilling Uganda'. The Plan denoted a paradigm shift to create employable skills and competencies relevant in the labour market instead of educational certificates. Increasing equitable access to skills development was one of the five overall objectives of the Strategic Plan.
181. After the approval of the TVET Policy in 2019, a TVET Policy Implementation Working Group (TPIWG) was constituted to oversee the implementation of the TVET reforms in line with the established coordination structures including the TVET Council. In 2020, Enabel as Chair of the Education Development Partners' Technical Working Group on Skilling (TWG-S) mapped all TVET Institutions supported by donors. The TWG-S met monthly and focused on providing technical support to the TVET Policy Implementation and strengthening relations between the MoES and the Ministry responsible for labour thus increasing advocacy through engagement of relevant government agencies.
182. During NDP II implementation period, the skills development sub-sector focused on: (i) massive skills training programs; (ii) review, redesign and alignment of the education curricula in the formal education system and the vocational training institutions, (iii) match the demand and supply to build

convergence between the skills acquired in school and those required in the market, (iv) strengthen science and technology education, (v) increase participation in tertiary and higher education and (vi) establish skill development centres of excellence in prioritised areas.

183. In order to promote private sector participation in the TVET system, Support to Skilling Uganda (SSU) in partnership with development partners supported the operationalization of the Sector Skills Councils (SSCs). To build an employer led TVET system, Enabel, in collaboration with the World Bank, supported the MoES to operationalise the five pilot Sector Skills Councils. Enabel supported Tourism and Hospitality Sector Skills Council and World Bank supported four SSCs for Agriculture, Construction, Manufacturing and Oil and Gas. The SSCs provided a framework for employers to indicate the skill sets they required. SSU intervention supported seven partner-training providers (5 in Albertine and Rwenzori and 2 in Karamoja) to become Centres of Excellence (CoEs). The support included infrastructural development, provision of modern tools and equipment, training of trainers and managers and system strengthening to respond to the needs of the communities and employers.

184. At a district level, the SSU intervention established Skills Development Platforms (SDPs) that generated discussions on pertinent skills development issues and aimed to improve the public perception of TVET. SSU intervention supported establishment of World Skills Uganda, an organization created to promote TVET through skills competitions. These structures provided an institutional framework to ensure that skills development initiatives were responsive to private sector and labour market needs

185. In response to the local needs of the labour market, the SSU programme established Skills Development Platforms (SDPs) in the various programme areas. SDPs were particularly important forums in which major stakeholders in skilling at the local level (district or region) defined the critical skills needed and proposed solutions for closing the gaps. For sustainability and upward forwarding, the SSU programme strengthened national level structures through support to operationalize sector skills councils, which were supposed to provide technical expertise to the SDPs and link them to national level partners. For instance, the Tourism and Hospitality Sector Skills Council (THSSC) launched a Labour Market Scan for the tourism and hospitality sector targeting Karamoja, Albertine-Rwenzori and Kampala whose report detailed the key skills that were required in the targeted areas. The SSU programme finalized the Assessment and Training Package (ATP) for the Tourist Guide. The Minister of Tourism Wildlife and Antiquities launched the ATP in October 2020. In collaboration with Uganda Safari Guides Association (USAGA), Uganda Tourism Board, Uganda Tourism Association and Directorate of Industrial Training (DIT), the THSSC conducted a training of 20 Tourist Guide Assessors.

186. The Skills Development Fund (SDF) launched as a pilot financing model aimed to generate best practices that would inform the national financing mechanism for Uganda. Beyond the required skills, SDF grantees integrated cross cutting themes within their training modules and as a result, SDF trainees graduated with extra skills of working with people and entrepreneurship abilities required in the labour market especially under conditions of self-employment. The integration of ICT and digitalization was, however, still low (at 15%) within different skills development training modules. As part of SDF training, trainees received start-up kits (basic equipment and materials) to promote self-

employment and improved livelihood from the acquired skills trade. Awareness and promotion campaigns were conducted to enhance participation of vulnerable groups (youth, girls, Karamojongs, refugees) in SDF trainings.

187. As part of SDF, the project implemented short competence enhancement vocational and technical skills trainings (Instant Training) in collaboration with livelihood actors in Karamoja, Northern Uganda and Rwenzori-Albertine region. The trainings aimed at strengthening skills for improved livelihood and employment opportunities among youths, women and vulnerable populations. Through instant training, 2750 beneficiaries were trained in the target areas. In Rwenzori Albertine region, 699 trainees (378 female) were trained, above the set target of 500 trainees. In Northern Uganda, 2185 trainees (1508 female) were trained, below the set target of 2400 trainees and 1221 trainees (49%) were refugees. In Karamoja region, 866 trainees (689 female) were trained against the set target of 1000 trainees and 773 trainees (77%) were Karamojongs (Enabel, 2020).

188. Under the Skills Development Programmes, under DIT/BTVET, the Modular (Non-Formal) Assessments included 7,952 trainees under the Presidential initiative on skilling the girl child, 892 trainees under the Presidential initiative for the boy child, 169 special needs candidates from Mbale Secondary and Vocational for the Deaf, Uganda Society for the Blind etc (MoFPED, 2020c).

189. The Government had focused on mainstreaming BTVET in education training, which was galvanised by the enactment of TVET policy by Parliament. The new TVET policy focused on establishing vocational institutions (UVIs) from lower level education to a technical university (TU). It was established that BTVET continued to lack clout within the institutional structure of the education sector was attributed to the general negative mind-set towards vocational training.

190. The NDPPII had targeted to increase BTVET enrolment from 55,476 in FY2017/18 to 59,744 in FY2018/19. Documentary review revealed that BTVET enrolment had improved from 40,830 students enrolled in 2015 to 49,654 students in 2017, which was attributed to the increased number of BTVET institutions that had increased from 119 in FY2015/16 to 129 in FY2016/17. Analogously, university enrolments constituted 72% of the 259,000 enrolments in tertiary education sub-sector in FY2017/18.

191. A Uganda Skills Development Authority (USDA) was established with its Secretariat housed by the MoES. Similarly, a Skills Development Council (SDC) was to be set up but it was never operationalized. The BTVET institutions remained in the periphery, yet they were critical institutions that could generate skills, which would drive the transformation of the country. There was an urgent need to address this contradiction to revitalize and mainstream TVET institutions as champions of skills development through creating incentives that can attract private sector participation in technical education and training. In addition, the remuneration of technical instructors should be enhanced to attract professional staff.

192. State House planned to skill 7,200 youth annually at 13 State-House controlled hubs with capacity of 300 trainees each in the fields of carpentry, welding, tailoring and hairdressing starting July 2022. The 13 hubs included Gulu (Acholi sub region), Lira (Lango), Mbarara (Ankole), Kasesse and Kyenjojo (Toro), Mubende (Greater Mubende), Kayunga (Mengo), Mbale (Bugisu), Napak (Karamoja), Kween (Sebei), Masindi (Bunyoro) and Zombo (West Nile). Additional hubs were to be constructed in Soroti (Teso), Kibuku (Bukedi), Adjumani (Madi), Ntoroko (Rwenzori), Kabale (Kigezi), Masaka (Buganda) and Jinja (Busoga) (New Vision, 2022).

4.13. Institutional Framework for Social Development

193. The MoGLSD was the lead agency for the sector working in collaboration with range semi-autonomous councils that included those covering youth, women, children and older people, and the Equal Opportunities Commission. There were two DP Working Groups supporting the sector covering gender and social protection: Social Protection (UNICEF/WFP) and Gender (Sweden). The sector objectives related to social protection, women's empowerment, employment and community mobilization.
194. The Social Development Sector mandated under Chapter 4 Articles 31 – 40 and Chapter 16 Article 246 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda protected and promoted the rights of the vulnerable population, addressed gender inequalities, ensured cultural growth, labour and employment as well as community mobilization and empowerment. The sector focused on children protection by investigating and following ups on child abuse cases through the toll free helpline (116); increased coverage of the disability grant to all Local Governments, increased recovery of Youth Livelihood Funds to benefit more youth; skilled women through Uganda Women Entrepreneurship Program and expanded coverage against Gender Based Violence.
195. The social sector development institutional framework was participatory and involved multiple stakeholders while the Social Development Sector Plan (SDSP) was implemented through a decentralized approach to service delivery. LGs and the autonomous and semi-autonomous agencies under the sector played key roles in the implementation of the sector interventions limiting themselves to only those strictly stipulated by law.
196. NDP2 undertook to: (i) strengthen the Labour Market Information System (LMIS) and Employment Services, (ii) implement a national programme for women economic empowerment, (iii) promote creative industries for job creation especially for the youth; establishing and operationalizing productivity centres at national and regional levels for improving productivity of the workers in Uganda. In addition, it focused on: (iv) developing and implementing a programme to inculcate positive values and mind sets to produce “skilled and cultured people;” and (v) expanding access to contributory social security for workers in the informal sector and gradual roll-out of a non-contributory social pension scheme for older persons and scaling up the youth livelihood programme.
197. The social sector made a number of cumulative achievements over the NDP II period under the sector priorities of the Social Development Sector Plan (2015/16-2019/20) (MoGLSD, 2016).

The MoLGSD strengthened child protection systems where 641 street children (400 boys) were withdrawn rehabilitated and resettled of whom 263 (31 boys and 210 girls) were from Karamoja North-east region and 378 children (369 boys) from other parts of the country. The problem of Karamojong street children persisted and decisive solutions were required including busting cells that are responsible for their welfare while on the streets.

198. The proportion of Youth with Disabilities who benefited from Government livelihood support stood at 2.81%. 168 PWDs against a target of 250 were trained in carpentry and joinery, metal fabrication, cosmetology, handcraft, tailoring, leatherwork, food science skills at Mpumudde (65), Ocoko (38), Lweza (15) and Kireka (50) Rehabilitation centers. The proportion of targeted older persons accessing grants improved to 11% in 2019/20 from 10% in 2018/19. Government rolled out the SAGE program in all districts benefitting 201,168 older persons (121,667 Females).

199. MoGLSD maintained Juvenile homes in all regions for corrective actions for children who break the law and provided food and non-food items to them. 2,335 Children in conflict with the law (1,977 boys) were provided psychosocial services at Remand homes and Rehabilitation Centre at Kampringisa. A Centre was established at Nakawa to handle national response to GBV specific issues using a toll free line (116). It resulted in increased awareness and coverage of Gender Based Violence management systems in the Country. The number of GBV cases resolved in the country increased from 4863 in 2014/15 to 9500 in 2019/20.

200. Cultural/ Traditional Leaders of Emorimor Papa Iteso, Omukama wa Buruli, Kamuswaga wa Kooki, Inzu ya Masaba, Obudingiya wa Bwamba, Isebantu Kyabazinga wa Busoga, Ikumbania wa Bugerere, Omukama wa Bunyoro Kitara, Lwawi Rwodi me Acholi, Kwar Adhola, Omusinga wa Rwenzururu, Won Nyanci me Lango, Omukama wa Tooro, Rwoth Ubimeu me Alur were supported with monthly emoluments.

201. The sector faced a number of challenges. The YLF and UWEP although started as well intentioned programs, lacked proper institutional frameworks to guarantee viability of the economic activities engaged in by the women and youth groups. It was widely believed that some of youth groups that received support under the YLF were non-existent an indication that the institutions that appraised and monitored the programs were not up to the task or were weak. The challenge formed the basis for the suggestion that both YLF and UWEP should be transferred to the Uganda Micro-Finance Support Centre which was assumed to have institutional capacity to appraise, supervise and monitor such funds amidst its own institutional challenges.

202. Although MoLGSD was the Ministry responsible for community mobilisation and empowerment function through the Community Services Department at the LGs, this function was duplicated by other sectors including education, agriculture, works, health, energy etc leading to inefficiency in service delivery. The challenge could have been solved through streamlining the funding for Community Development functions scattered in the various sectors into one vote for Community mobilisation.

203. The staffing level at the MoLGSD and its institutions on average stood at 53% (63% for Ministry and 43% for the institutions). Understaffing affected service delivery to the children, youth and PWDs. The needs of the vulnerable groups increased every subsequent year yet the MoDLSD had no comprehensive regulatory framework to address them.
204. The MoGLSD had no integrated system to record all the beneficiaries of the Social Development Sector programmes and worse still the different systems that existed were not linked and therefore making it easy for a client(s) to benefit from all the Ministry programmes, YLP, UWEP, Youth Venture Capital Fund and Wealth Creation among others.
205. Trafficking in persons and poor welfare of migrant workers was a recurrent challenge for the sector. Migrant workers often used informal channels to access employment abroad. Some migrant workers often got into problems and they eventually sought Government interventions, which were costly. Relatedly, the labour structures of the LGs were not all filled and majority of the labour officers in the LGs were by assignment, which compromised the delivery of labour services in the LGs. There were undertones that MoGLSD had not been decisive in handling the issue of labour migrants and due attention was required given the high youth and graduate-youth unemployment in Uganda (MoLGSD, 2020).
206. The media played an active role of flagging up challenges faced by migrant workers, which included harassment, mistreatment, human rights violation, corruption and sex & drug abuse. It was believed that poor implementation and compliance with the 2017 bilateral agreements with countries like Saudi Arabia that hosted more than 140, 000 Ugandan migrant workers who annually remitted about USD 900m to Uganda needed due attention (New Vision, 2022).

4.14 Institutional Framework for Water and Environment

207. Water and Environment are at the fundamental for: sustainable development, socio-economic development, healthy ecosystems, human survival and reducing the global burden of disease as well as important in improving the health, welfare and productivity of populations. Water is also at the heart of adaptation to climate change, serving as the crucial link between the climate system, human society and the environment. Water is a finite and irreplaceable resource that is fundamental to human well-being.
208. The Water and Environment sector comprised of two sub-sectors: the Water and Sanitation (WSS) sub-sector and the Environment and Natural Resources (ENR) sub-sector. The WSS sub-sector included water resources management, rural water supply and sanitation, urban water supply and sanitation as well as water for production. The ENR sub-sector comprised of the environmental management; management of forests and trees; management of wetlands and aquatic resources as well as weather and climate.
209. The water and environment sector institutional framework consisted of: (a) the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) as the lead agency with the Directorates for Water Development (DWD), Water Resources Management (DWRM) and Directorate Environmental Affairs (DEA); (b) Local Governments (Districts and Town Councils) in charge of the delivery of decentralized services, (c) a

number of de-concentrated support structures related to MWE that included Technical Support Units (TSUs), Water Supply Development Facilities (WSDFs), Water Management Zones (WMZs) as well as the Umbrella for Water and Sanitation Authorities; (d) four semi-autonomous agencies: (i) National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) for urban water supply and sewerage in the large towns; (ii) National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) for environment management; (iii) National Forestry Authority (NFA) for forestry management in Government's Central Forest Reserves and (iv) the Uganda National Meteorological Authority (UNMA) for weather and climate services; (e) Sector NGOs/CBOs (coordinated through UWASNET and ENR-CSO Network) and Water User Committees/Associations; (f) the private sector (water and sanitation infrastructure operators, contractors, consultants and suppliers of goods) as well as communities that are the users/consumers of the provided services.

210. Activities undertaken in Sanitation and Water for Production (mainly focusing on agricultural and animal production) required close coordination with other line ministries that included MoH, MoES, and MAAIF. The Water and Environment Sector Working Group (WESWG) provided policy and technical guidance and had representatives from key public sector institutions, Development Partners and NGOs).
211. The WESWG was chaired by the Permanent Secretary and co-chaired by two lead Development Partners one for the Water and Sanitation sub-sector and the other for the Environment and Natural Resources (ENR) sub-sector. In order to effectively handle cross-cutting issues, the WESWG had other seven (7) functional sub-groups (FSG) that included Finance, Good Governance, Sector Capacity Development, De-concentrated Structures, Sanitation, Catchment Management and Climate Change Sub-Groups. The Sub-groups enabled participation by members from Development Partners in the Water and Environment sector (WES), Civil Society Organizations, line MDAs, private sector and LG representatives.
212. The main technology options used for water supply improvements in rural areas included deep boreholes (44.7%), shallow wells (23.1%) and protected springs (20.8%) as well as tap stands/kiosks of piped schemes and rainwater harvesting tanks (11.3%). As of June 2020, the national safe water coverage in rural areas had declined to 68% compared to 69% as of June 2019. During the FY 2019/20, 608 new boreholes were constructed and 1,096 rehabilitated, 57 piped water systems with 587 taps and 90 protected springs were constructed and 116 rainwater harvesting systems (ferro cement tanks, Plastic tanks and Communal) of 10m³ were installed. The percentage of water points with functional water and sanitation committees increased from 89% in June 2019 to 90% in June 2020.
213. Uganda's urban population was estimated at 10 million (24% of Ugandan population) and it was likely to double by 2040. Uganda's urban population growth was at a higher rate and had outstripped the rate of infrastructure development. The high urban population growth rate was attributed to rural-urban migration and creation of new districts, cities, municipalities and town councils which led to gazetting former rural areas as urban areas. Uganda had a total of 498 urban centres comprising of 15 Cities (14 newly approved Cities), 55 Municipalities, 47 newly approved Counties and 442 Town Councils and Town Boards. There were more than 1,100 rural growth centres (RGC) with a population of about 3.3 million that were expected to be gazetted as urban centres. Uganda had a total of 68,731 Villages where

- 16,154 villages are in Large Towns, 14,494 villages are in Small Towns / Rural Growth Centres and 38,083 villages were in Rural areas.
214. The population using an improved drinking water source in urban areas reduced from 79% in June 2019 to 70.5% in June 2020. Access to safely managed water (available on premises) remained at 57.11% in urban areas. 67,661 new connections were made of which 5,197 connections were by Umbrella Authorities and 61,246 by NWSC. 16 small towns water supply systems were constructed and completed with 383 Public Stand Posts (PSP), 23 institutional connections and 4,032 Yard Tap Connections. They were expected to serve a total of 534 villages and 310,320 people in small towns. NWSC geographical coverage increased from 253 towns as at 30th June 2019 to 258 towns as at 30th June 2020, a growth of 2%. Functionality of small towns and rural growth centres piped water supply systems reduced from 94.3% in June 2019 to 81.23% while the average per capita investment cost for the new water facilities was USD57.95 compared to USD 58 in FY 2018/19.
215. The cumulative WfP storage increased from 41.124 million m³ in FY 2018/19 to 42.0 million m³. The major focus of the FY 2019/20 was on solar mini micro irrigation systems aimed at boosting agricultural production and less reliance on weather, solar powered water supply systems that provided domestic water supply to reduce distances and crowding of people at water points as well as increase efficiency in water supply at water points. Construction of water supply points targeted at least one source per village and 100% coverage in service areas managed by NWSC.
216. Regarding Water Resources Management, the Lake Victoria levels continued to oscillate above the long-term average of 1134.37 metres above mean sea level (11.48 metres above the local datum) since the end of 2013. Lake Victoria recorded a new highest daily level of 13.49 metres on the afternoon of 19th May 2020. A total of 629 samples were collected to assess the water quality for rural water sources compared to 1,107 samples in FY 2018/19. Compliance increased to 67% from 64% in the previous year. Water safety by technology type was; 81% of boreholes, 55% shallow wells and 37% protected springs had safe water for drinking based on compliance to bacteriological safety or E.coli. Fifty percent (50%) and 90% of protected springs in Entebbe and Kampala, respectively were contaminated with E.coli. The compliance levels with respect to E. coli for small towns was 94% compared to 96% in FY 2018/19.
217. In relation to Sanitation and Hygiene, most districts implemented Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) and Home Improvement Campaigns (HIC) to improve their sanitation and hygiene status. Access to some form of sanitation in rural areas increased from 77.2% to 78% according to District reports. In urban areas, access to some form of sanitation also increased from 87.9% to 89.1%. Use of safely managed sanitation in rural areas remained at 7.1% and in urban areas increased from 37.4% to 38.9%. The national standards recommended a pupil to stance ratio of 40:1 in schools. According to MWE, the national pupil: stance ratio increased from 71:1 to 72:1. Access to hand washing facilities in schools increased from 42% in FY 2018/19 to 58%. The MWE (District reports) revealed that 22 % of the rural population were practising open defecation.
218. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) investment in FY 2019/20 was UGX 52.12 bn compared to UGX 69.13 bn in FY 2018/19. UGX 29.88 bn was invested in water supply and UGX 9.72 bn in sanitation and hygiene. In addition, CSOs invested UGX 0.77 bn in water for production, UGX 8.08 bn in capacity building and UGX 0.60 bn in research and development. CSOs constructed 251 boreholes, 110

rainwater harvesting tanks and 15 shallow wells. Constructed 10 piped water supply systems and rehabilitated/expanded 11 during the FY 2019/20.

219. Wetlands Management, in 1994, the wetland coverage on the surface area of Uganda was 15.6% but had reduced to 8.9% by June 2020 due to expansion in Agriculture, industry and urbanization. During the FY 2019/20, a total of 6,642.939 ha of critical wetlands were restored across the country. The cumulative boundary of wetland demarcated since 2012 was 2208.9km (1.56%) out of the 141,366km earmarked for demarcation countrywide.
220. During the NDP II, De-forestation remained the major challenge that led to decline of forest cover from 24% in 1990 to 10% in 2017 but had improved to 12.4% by June 2020. 2,233ha of degraded natural forests were restored through planting indigenous tree species and bamboo. 19,800.4ha of industrial tree plantations with above 70% survival were established (1,400.4ha by NFA and 18,400ha by licensed tree farmers). 307Km of forest boundary was resurveyed and marked with concrete pillars. Relatedly, a total of 114,528,770 assorted seedlings out of the target 175 million seedlings increased forest cover during NDP II period, representing 65% performance. 26,398,947 of the annual planned 31,400,000 assorted seedlings (84%) were produced and supplied for tree planting from 12 NFA regional tree nurseries and 22 community nurseries for increasing tree cover across the country.
221. Environmental Support Services, during the NDP II period, Six (6) districts were supported to develop bye-Laws in Mbale (Wanale & Nyendo), Bulambuli (Bulageni & Sisiyi), and Manafwa (khabutoola & Nalondo) Mitoma, Ntungamo, and Buhweju. Eighty (80) environmental inspectors were trained in Environment integrity and sustainability of the green and brown environment following the gazette of 774 environmental inspectors in FY 2018/19.
222. Meteorology, Weather and Climate Services, UNMA support to the Aviation sector was provided through issuance of 2196 Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts and 13700 flight folders to enable air navigation in and outside the country. State of the climate report for Uganda for 2019 was completed and the first weather Radar was installed at Kigungu-Entebbe and was operational. CSOs active in ENR reported a contribution of USD 1,987,482. Investment in environment constituted USD 529,425 for forestry, USD 467,909 for environment and USD 346,802 climate change among others. Relatedly, the percentage of Water Source Committees (WSC) with women holding key positions had increased to 86% from 85% by June 2020.
223. Critical Issues for the Sector included :(i) Inadequate funding which affected the fulfilment of core functions of the sector. Limited funding to facilitate the Rural Water and Sanitation Regional Centres (RWSRCs) operations in the country affected service delivery among the DLGs, (ii) Capacity gaps in the sector remained a critical issue particularly in newly created LGs, Umbrella Authorities and the ENR subsector, (iii) the creation of new districts affected the threshold allocated to other districts as this did not translate into additional funds, (iv) vandalism of the water infrastructure for purposes of selling them as steel scrap targeting mainly solar panels and generators was a common vice. It consequently affected the supply of water to communities as the distribution pipes and taps were targeted resulting in consumption of unsafe water and (v) COVID-19 outbreak affected the implementation of activities such as site meetings, verification and construction works by the LGs. Travel restrictions within the country affected the implementation of sensitization activities since the

activity required gathering people and travelling across districts (MWE, 2020). There were capacity gaps at district and lower local government levels in terms of staffing levels and technical capacities.

4.15 Institutional Framework for Public Administration

224. Public administration comprised both public sector management and public administration sectors. *Public administration* was responsible for staff deployment and coordination of service delivery across ministries and agencies. It consisted of OP; OPM, MoLG and MoPS. Other actors were NPA, MoFA, Electoral Commission (EC) and Ministry for Economic Monitoring. *Public Sector Management* included OPM, MoPS, East African Affairs, NPA, Public Service Commission, MoLG and LGFC. The Lead Development Partners were Public Service – World Bank and Decentralisation – United Nations Development Programme.
225. Due to their diversity and or disparity and difficulty in obtaining common objectives, during the implementation period of NDP2 both public sector management (PSM) and public administration (PA) were considered separate SWGs which was contrary to the spirit of both the sector wide approach and program based planning and budgeting. While outcomes of the OPM focused on coordination of implementation and monitoring those of NPA focused on planning and evaluation, which required different interventions. On the other hand, the objectives and outcomes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were quite different from those of OP and EC with whom planning and budgeting were conducted. Whereas the MTR recommended the reconstitution of the PSM and PA sectors before end of NDPII to facilitate useful sector wide planning and budgeting, the recommendation was not implemented.
226. The institutional framework disconnect for public administration was a deterrent to improved service delivery for socio economic transformation which was attributed to the slow pace of the rationalisation of the public institutions that was anticipated during the NDP 2 period. There were undertones that the institutional performance of the Office of the President was dominated by activities of State House and the Ministry for Security which, constrained policy analysis under cabinet secretariat and hampered economic monitoring and establishment of grass-root-based information system⁷.
227. OPM was mandated to coordinate implementation of the NDP. The OPM was scattered between coordination and implementation responsibilities, which rendered it inefficient and structurally constrained in terms of staff, funds and time to decisively execute its core function of coordination. The MTR correctly noted that the OPM has deviated from its core function of coordination to actual implementation and auxiliary activities such as Relief and Disaster Management and affirmative regional programmes (Karamoja, Bunyoro, Luwero and Northern Uganda). It recommended that amidst financial and non-financial constraints that dominated the literature related the coordination

⁷ The resources for collecting security information at Sub-county and parish levels have been constrained by unplanned activities

inefficiency of the OPM, implementation of existing programmes under OPM be reverted to the most appropriate sectors, ministries and agencies to minimise conflict of interest (s).

228. Public Administration was mandated to determine remuneration, public information management and sharing as well as results-based management (efficiency) of MDAs. The payment of a living wage started with Permanent Secretaries but had not been cascaded pro-rata resulting in discriminatory remunerations across sectors and worse still within the similar categories or functions like teaching in primary and secondary school levels. The failure by Government to curtail Members of Parliament from determining their remuneration and allowances remained a sticky matter during the NDP 2 period. Empirics were not in line with the allegation that low remunerations across MDAs and LGs was a catalyst to corruption. There were divergent feelings about assertions to establish and operationalize a salaries commission to harmonize the remuneration structures across MDAs, which was mandate of the Ministry of Public Service.

229. The underperformance of MDAs and LGs against NDP2 set targets was attributed to weak institutional structures, duplicated mandates, redundancies and inadequate capacities. The problems associated with duplication and or overlap of mandates were analysed by the MoPS report on “Review and Rationalization of Government Agencies and Public Expenditure” and formed a basis for the proposed merging and or disbanding of institutions to enhance efficiency across Government. The terminal evaluation of the NDP II recommended that the rationalisation exercise of public sector must concluded before new public agencies were created but better still any specialised function should be properly streamed in existing MDAs.

230. The terminal evaluation of the NDP II noted of the assertions of the MTR to the effect that LGs had not been efficient and effective in the delivery of decentralised services because of low staffing levels, weak fiscal decentralization, weak LG council leadership that largely lacked requisite capacities and knowledge of public administration, unviability of some LGs and policy reversals. Decentralization had not therefore caused the local economic development that had been envisaged by NDP2. Requisite qualifications should be appended to the roles and responsibilities of LG Councillors to enhance harmony between Councillors and LG staff.

4.16 Institutional Framework for Accountability Sector

231. The Accountability Sector contributed to the fourth objective of NDP II. The fourth objective of NDP II aimed to strengthen mechanisms for quality, effective and efficient service delivery. The sector was quite complex as it related to central support services of 11 MDAs and a further 10 affiliated institutions and covered a varied range of mandates. The Accountability Sector was composed of two Sub Sectors: (i) Economic and Financial Management Services and (ii) Audit. The Sector focused on mobilization, management and accounting for the utilization of public resources to facilitate the delivery of quality and equitable services.

232. The Accountability SWG chaired by the Accountant General had a membership of 23 institutions. The Accountability Sector Working Group had a number of committees. The Leadership Committee chaired by the Minister of the MoFPED provided political leadership, policy guidance and strategic

direction to the Sector. Its membership included Ministers responsible for Public Service, LG, Ethics and Integrity, KCCA, IGG and the Auditor General.

233. The Steering Committee chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Inspectorate of Government (IG) was responsible for formulating sector policies and priorities. Membership included Accounting Officers and Chief Executives of Accountability Sector Institutions.
234. The Accountability Sector Working Group chaired by the Accountant General was the technical committee that implemented Sector policies in line with Accountability Sector Investment Plan (ASIP). Its membership included Directors from the Accountability Sector Institutions, representatives of Development Partners, CSOs and the private sector. It was operationalized through Technical Working Groups (TWGs) i.e. Economic Management; Resource Mobilization and Allocation; Budget Execution and Accountability; Audit/Anticorruption. The TWGs were co-chaired by Development Partners.
235. The SWG met quarterly and was coordinated by a Secretariat with full-time staff. The SWG followed Public investment guidelines while identifying, appraising and approving development projects. Regional accountability forums provided feedback on service delivery. Quarterly reports from institution and on-site visits by the Secretariat were conducted before regional forums. There was, however, no system of tracking off budget support by development partners. Meetings were not well coordinated and planned and hence there was need to adhere to schedules. The lack of enforceable legal frameworks that defined CSO and private sector representation in terms of numbers, their roles and nature of participation, limited incubation of best practices on accountability from the private sector.
236. The Public Financial Management (PFM) (part of the Accountability Sector) had effective coordination systems to promote PFM reforms across GoU with support from the joint Development Partner Finance Management Programme (DP FINMAP). The Public Expenditure Management Committee (PEMCOM) chaired by the Deputy Secretary to Treasury with a Development Partner from the PFM Working Group as co-chair started its meetings with statements from GoU and DPs followed by statements from a representative of the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG). The Private Sector Foundation Uganda represented the private sector. The PEMCOM action matrix was used to track progress and or non-progress of key reforms and set time-lines to assess achievement of agreed actions.
237. The audit and anti-corruption functions were largely the responsibility of the Auditor General's Office and Inspectorate of Government. A number of public institutions and or Departments were, however, involved in fighting corruption including: (i) the Criminal Investigation Department, (ii) the Anti-Corruption Court, a division of the High Court and (iii) non-statutory institutions such as Anti-Corruption Unit in Presidents Office.
238. The terminal evaluation team noted that whereas the Auditor General's Office and Inspectorate of Government had carried out their functions fairly, systemic and institutional challenges made it difficult to achieve value for money for public works particularly energy and construction projects. The capacity of Auditor General's Office to undertake value for money

audits for public works particularly energy and infrastructure as well as construction projects remained work in-progress during the NDP II period.

239. The Office of the Auditor General had greatly improved the timeliness of submission of consolidated audited accounts to the Public Account Committee of Parliament. The Audit Reports submitted to Parliament were, however, largely of no consequence due to the inability of partner institutions to pursue adduced evidence in the audit and parliamentary reports. Worse still, Audit reports submitted to LG political heads were in most cases not acted upon fully due to political considerations.

240. Proper use of public funds generally improved as evidenced by the substantial reduction in qualified opinions by the Auditor General. Of the 453 financial audits concluded (MDA, Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises, Projects, Districts and Municipalities) by the Office of the Auditor General during the FY 2018/19, 420 (93%) entities had unqualified opinions while only 33 (7%) entities had qualified opinions. MDAs and LGs were put on the MoFPED IFMS, which made it possible to track all financial transactions and detect cases where funds could have been misappropriated. In addition, the entire budgeting system was computerized for both MDAs and LGs though there undertones of its compatibility with LGs.

241. There were divergences between appropriation by Parliament and final allocation by MoFPED that was attributed to weaknesses in budget processes or frequent ad-hoc supplementary budget requests. Although it was argued that the budget supplementary requests were legal and were in line with the provision of the PMFA 2015, they signalled either poor planning or failure to accord due attention to the budgeting process. The terminal evaluation shared the displeasure of other stakeholders towards the institutionalised budget supplementary requests since they eroded the credibility of the budget and that of the institutions mandated to execute it over the NDP II period. Supplementary budgets led to cuts in sector budgets, which negatively affects achievement of targets or fiscal deficit financing through domestic borrowing and printing as well as issuance of currency not backed by production.

4.17 Institutional Framework of Justice Law and Order Sector

242. The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (lead agency of the sector) was responsible for upholding the rule of law, driving forward the legal and justice system, and reforming and safeguarding the Constitution to serve the public effectively. Membership of sector was diverse and included the Judiciary, MoIA, Uganda Police Force, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Uganda Prisons Service, Uganda Human Rights Commission, Judicial Service Commission, Uganda Registration Services Bureau, Uganda Law Reform Commission and National Identification and Registration Authority. Other public agencies in the sector included Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control, MoGLSD (Juvenile Justice), MoLG (Local Council Courts), Uganda Law Society, Tax Appeals Tribunal, Law Development Centre and Centre for Arbitration and Dispute Resolution.

243. During the FY 2018/19, the sector facilitated DPP/CID coordination meetings and supported national level meetings of the JLOS structures including the leadership, steering committee and working groups and annual review. The participation of CSOs had been institutionalised. In addition, the leadership of the sector held six-monthly informal dinners with DP JLOS heads of cooperation to promote open dialogue. Relatedly, the sector actively promoted District Coordination structures to enhance collaboration of sector institutions at district level (Roberts and Sejjaaka, 2017).

244. JLOS as conceptualized in NDP2 was an enabling sector that encompassed all sectors and sub-sectors, provided a conducive environment and framework for efficient performance of all sectors in the economy thus harnessing intersectoral linkages.

245. The sector performance during the FY 2018/19 was good. Trust of the people in JLOS institutions increased from 49% to 59% according to the LASPNET State of Access to Justice Report 2017 amidst widespread incidences of torture. The sector registered a reduction in case backlog for cases that were more than three years in the system to 12.5%. The crime rate reduced from 298 to 287.9 for every 100,000 partly due the adoption of crime prevention measures such as community policing.

246. The wave of kidnaps and high profile murders during the FY 2018/19 needed thorough investigation. The average time taken to dispose cases reduced from 1,095 days to 810 days though it was remained short of the targeted 720 days. It was not clear whether that also applied to land cases or disputes. The Uganda Prisons Service made significant contribution towards feeding of its prisoners through own production of cereals.

247. The sector faced a number of challenges. There were complaints about lost files and overstay in police cells and the sector struggled to mainstream the National Policy on Zero Tolerance to Corruption. The Uganda Police Force was consistent in all IG corruption perception surveys as one of the most corrupt institutions. Analogously, there was a tendency of institutionalized crime as manifested in increasing number of police officers that were in court for committing heinous crimes.

248. There was low (and or insignificant) enforcement of the Anti-Torture law. The main issue with Human Rights Commission (HRC) was, however, the escalating unpaid awards to claimants. Relatedly, the continued presence of the bucket system in police cells was human rights issue that needed due attention. The overcrowding in prisons and poor transport facilitation of prisoners to courts of law especially upcountry continued to be a challenge that needed due attention by the Uganda Prisons Service (JLOS, 2021).

Legislative Function

249. The key role of Parliament was to make new laws and change or improve old ones - the reason why the Parliament was also known as the legislature. The Legislation function focused on introduction of private members' bills, review of government bills within committees of Parliament and amendment of existing laws. The 10th Parliament witnessed a re-introduction of unfinished business key among these were 19 bills. As at June 2019, Parliament planned to pass 70 bills but registered 77% success with 54 bills passed into laws and 6 withdrawn by the Executive. In addition, Parliament:

(i) improved standards of legislation procedures through the amended Rules of Procedure of Parliament; (ii) Parliamentary Committees continued to be open to the public during Bill processing and (iii) enhanced provision of technical support for the development of Private Member's Bills and Committees.

250. The Parliament of Uganda undertook major reforms after the enactment of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. In 1996, the Plan for Modernization of Parliament was later revised and transformed into the Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Development Plan (PSIDP) that focused on capacity building of Members of Parliament, Parliamentary staff and the Institution of Parliament. The Administration of Parliament Act, 1997, provided for the creation of the Parliamentary Commission and the Parliamentary Service.

251. The 1995 Constitution and subsequent constitutional reforms made provisions for the representation in Parliament that included directly elected Constituency Members of Parliament, District Woman Representatives, Ex-Official Members and Special Interest Groups to include; Youth Representatives, Workers, Army Representatives as well as the Elderly Members of Parliament.

252. The 2005 Constitutional amendments made provision for a multiparty political dispensation in the Parliamentary System of Uganda that led to the creation of new political offices. The new offices were: the Office of Government Chief Whip that was restructured and renamed Office of the Leader of Government Business (OLGB) and the Office of the Leader of Opposition (OLOP). The amendments also empowered Parliament to restructure Parliamentary Committees for the efficient discharge of its mandate.

253. The Parliamentary Commission was chaired by the Rt. Hon. Speaker and its membership consisted of the Rt. Hon. Deputy Speaker, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, Planning & Economic Development, the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament and four back-bench Members of Parliament elected by the House. The Parliamentary Commission established a Board of Management (BOM), later renamed Top Management Team (TMT), chaired by the Clerk to Parliament and comprised of Heads of Department and political offices. The TMT ensured proper management of the operations of the Parliamentary Service and made recommendations for policy decisions to the Parliamentary Commission.

254. The Legislative arm of government (Parliament) carried out the oversight role over the Executive. It had in place specific organs/Parliamentary Committees whose functions were to: (a) examine government bills; (b) initiate bills and assess and evaluate government programs, projects and activities as well as (d) question government spending and actions to ensure value for money.

255. In terms of representation, the membership of the 10th Parliament was on the upward trend with a total of 427 MPs as at June 2016, 449 MPs as at June 2017, 452 MPs as at June 2018 and 459 MPs as at June 2019. There was an increase of women representation, 34.9% as of June 2019. Members of Parliament had various backgrounds, professions and interests, which pointed to a rich form of representation.

256. During the NDP II period, the approved national budgets grew at an annual average of 16%. The growth in the national budget imposed additional responsibilities to Parliament for enhanced scrutiny

and oversight of the budget. The total budget for FY2019/20 was approved as Shs. 40,489 billion, while FY2018/19 was Shs. 32,303 billion, FY2017/18 was Shs. 29,009 billion and FY2016/17 was Shs. 26,362 billion. In all the four FYs, Parliament was able to process and pass national budgets within the stipulated timeframe under the PFMA (2015). Nevertheless, the total accumulated budget for the four years was below the anticipated NDP II costing, due to resource constraints.

257. Despite the achievements, the legislative function of Parliament faced challenges during the NDP II period that included but not limited to: (i) low response of the public to the bill consultation process newspaper adverts invited stakeholders to give their input on the bills, (ii) delays in processing of bills into Acts of Parliament such as the “The anti-counterfeiting goods Bill 2015” which pended for over three years yet its passage would have positively impacted on the business environment and (iii) technicalities such as obtaining the certificate of financial implication from the MoFPED hindered the progress of Private Members’ bills before the house. By the close of the FY 2018/19, 17 members were granted leave for private members’ bills but only one came through.
258. The oversight function of Parliament faced challenges that included: (i) delayed and or inadequate responses from the cabinet/MDAs to the questions and concerns raised during plenary and committee meetings, (ii) limited public participation in the process of vetting candidates suitable for holding a public office, (iii) inadequate information on the implementation of the international protocols which made it difficult for Parliament to oversee Government’s commitments and/or activities carried out at international level and (iv) inadequate resources to carry out evidence based oversight.
259. The representation function under the Legislature sector faced challenges that included: (i) weak whipping system that was reflected by the Members’ poor attendance at the plenary sittings and Committee meetings as well as the debating process during plenary, (ii) inadequate appreciation of multiparty democracy that led to friction among the individual Members of Parliament, their political parties and the electorate and (iii) inadequate resources to implement good practices from international engagements for better outcomes.
260. Parliament faced challenges in regards to budget scrutiny that included: (i) submission of incomplete budgetary information by MDAs to Parliament. Every year, over 50% of MDAs tabled draft Ministerial Policy Statements to simply meet the timelines stipulated within the PFMA 2015 which constrained the time that Parliament had to scrutinize the national budget, (ii) limited capacity of the MPs and Staff in appreciating and comprehending the continuously emerging Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms, (iii) the enormous responsibility placed on Parliament by the PFMA (2015) amidst resource constraints and under staffing in critical areas that was worsened by the growing economy and Government administrative structures (Votes) and (iv) a number of MDAs cited conflicting provisions with other laws (Parliament of Uganda, 2020).

PART IV: KEY INSTITUTIONAL PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

5.1. Design of the NDP

261. In 2017, Cabinet approved the Uganda Vision 2040, which stipulated the development paths and strategies required to operationalize Uganda's Vision statement, which was "A Transformed Ugandan Society from a Peasant to a Modern and Prosperous Country within 30 years." The achievement of the transformational goal was hinged on the country's capacity to strengthen the fundamentals of the economy to harness the abundant opportunities around the infrastructure (energy, transport, water, oil and gas, and ICT); Science, Technology, Engineering and Innovation (STEI); land use and management; urbanisation; human resource; and peace, security and defence.
262. Whereas the implementation of the Vision 2040 was led by H.E the President, it remained a joint responsibility of every citizen in Government, private sector, civil society, political organisations and any other institutions. The NDP II was implemented in line with the Comprehensive National Development Planning Framework and interventions were sequenced and detailed in 5-year National Development Plans and annual budgets. The National Development Plans guided the sectors and districts in setting their priorities and preparation of SIPs and DDPs, respectively.
263. Preparation of the NDP, SIPs and DDPs followed the bottom up approach. The process of drafting the National Development Plan was led by the NPA. During the process of drafting the policy and strategic direction of the country, sector consultations were conducted to ensure that the interventions were in line with the strategic direction of the plan. There was minimal if any consultations with LGs during the drafting process of the plan. The approach therefore was a top-down approach where LGs were required to align their plans to the NDP. This process needed to be reversed where LGs should develop their plans based on the needs and challenges of their respective areas. The LG plans would be synthesized into regional plans to craft the strategic direction for the country that would also guide sectors in their choice of objectives and interventions. Whereas regional plans would seemingly appear to be a best practice care should be taken to address the attendant systemic and institutional framework challenges associated with LGs and their capacity issues in relation to conducting feasibility studies and project preparation.
264. There was lack of clarity on the role of setting national priorities particularly for the national budget, PIPs, SIPs, and DDPs. The 1995 Constitution and the NPA Act were equally unspecific in this regard. This weakness led to lack of harmonization and consistence among the various plans, including the national budget. The weakness could have created uncoordinated implementation of programs and loopholes in accountability.

5.2. Project design and PIP Issues

265. NPA was tasked to strengthen the capacity of planning units of MDAs and LGs through trainings in project preparation and conducting of feasibility studies to facilitate timely implementation of projects. The aim was to ensure that before projects were included in the PIP, a prefeasibility study at the very least should have been conducted to ascertain their viability. It was noted that PIP contained both approved projects and project ideas at different stages of development.

5.3 Planning and budgeting

266. Once the strategic direction of the country had been determined, convergence of planning efforts was necessary to ensure that development objectives and interventions were directed towards its achievement. However: (i) the PIP continued to be produced by MoFPED without involvement of NPA, (ii) the MTEF and development of the Post 2015 Country strategy were undertaken by MoFPED with minimal or no involvement of the NPA, (iii) whereas the planning process continued to be guided by international frameworks such as the IMF policy guidelines, EAC regional commitments and multinational financing agencies, there was literally minimal consultations or no involvement of the NPA in negotiation of regional commitments.

5.4 Implementation

267. Whereas the implementation and management of the NDP II was under the overall leadership of H.E the President, the OPM ensured effective coordination of NDP implementation across sectors and MDAs. The OPM continued to coordinate implementation of the public sector programs and policies without major review of its institutional structures to focus on the NDP. There was no tangible evidence to show that the OPM had strengthened its Directorate of Policy Coordination and Implementation in terms of staffing levels and logistics. The Delivery Unit was not fully staffed and facilitated to fulfil their coordination mandates.

268. There were assertions that OPM should have in effect been responsible for approving sector and district quarterly and annual work plans and provide approvals to MoFPED for quarterly release of funds to districts and sectors. The terminal evaluation was of the view that OPM required optimal funding and facilitation to execute the suggested roles and responsibilities. The close linkage between the NRM Manifesto and the NDP II, however, resulted in unanticipated budget prioritisation and implementation of programs that were a priority of the NDP II. Relatedly, the invisible involvement of the Private Sector was attributed to the lack an institutional framework whose role would have to sell and solicit buy-ins for the NDP from the private sector amidst a weak PPP framework.

5.6 Monitoring and Evaluation

269. The NDP II institutional framework spelt out the monitoring roles. The National Planning Forum, chaired by H.E the President, was the highest institutional M & E organ for monitoring progress of the NDP. This forum was not fully functional to execute its monitoring responsibility. The OPM monitored government performance and reported to Cabinet on Government performance on a bi-annual basis. The MoFPED played its responsible for resource mobilization, formulation of national budgets and disbursement of budgetary resources, financial accountability and budget monitoring and reporting. NPA was responsible for establishing a results framework for the NDP and ensured that MDAs and LGs result indicators were consistent with the NDP results framework indicators.

270. A comprehensive and integrated M&E system for the NDP would have reduced duplication of reporting in sectors and local governments. OPM continued to focus on monitoring and

coordinating the implementation of the NDP programs with emphasis on Quarterly programs and projects performance assessments to ensure that they remained on track to achieve their intended outputs within the specified timelines. The monitoring and evaluation progress reports provided primary input for the MTRs and terminal evaluations of the NDPs. Both the MTR and terminal evaluation alluded to the fact that there was need to strengthen capacity of both the OPM and NPA to undertake their M & E roles, effectively.

5.7. Oversight

271. The Presidency supported by Parliament and its attendant statutory institutions played oversight roles for the NDP II. The private sector and civil society organisations did not submit their reports to Government for factual comments and improvement as well as to the public to create public awareness. The lack of a platform to enable the consolidation of various oversight reports into a single annual oversight report to be presented on the floor of Parliament for purposes of assessing the extent to which NDP II interventions are executed was a major bottleneck to the seamless implementation of the NDP II. In addition, oversight over the NDP had a number of challenges, which included inadequate capacity of OPM and other statutory bodies to provide timely quality requisite reports to inform the oversight function.

PART VI: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Summary of Findings

The major findings of the institutional framework terminal evaluation were highlighted as follows:

272. The institutional framework reforms expected to improve the political ownership and leadership as well as the technical capacity to ensure seamless implementation of the NDP 2 were not fully executed. Cabinet had not yet put in place a standing committee to handle NDP implementation matters. Relatedly, there was no committee of Parliament dedicated to National Development Planning. It was therefore not enough to prescribe structures, define their roles and or responsibilities even in the ideal situation of no overlaps or duplication of roles and responsibilities without ensuring that measures and or requisite legal frameworks were put in place to ensure their operationalization and optimal functionality. The technical staff at Parliament were emphatic to the effect that re-configuration of Parliamentary Committees required amendment of the laws that prescribed the functioning of Parliament.

273. The Office of The Prime Minister (OPM) coordinated and implemented government policies across MDAs and sectors. During the NDP II period, a Delivery Unit was established to strengthen the coordination function of the OPM. The Delivery Unit had an elaborate structure and its head was equivalent to a Cabinet Minister. It had a technical Deputy Head (equivalent to an Assistant Commissioner) who supervised seven thematic area⁸ team leaders (equivalent to

⁸ Education, Health, Infrastructure, Jobs and Income, Data and Policy Research, Agriculture, Finance

- a Principal Officer). The Delivery Unit was, however, understaffed (50%), insufficiently facilitated and not all staff had been trained in delivery of government programs hence curtailing its optimal functionality.
274. The lead agencies coordinating the Sector Working Groups were not effective due to lack of full time secretariats (they were mainly housed in planning departments of MDAs), inadequate technical capacity and under staffing, poor attendance by representatives of member institutions, which delayed decision making and the high affinity of public agencies to work in silos since funds were still sent to MDA votes.
275. Public institutions dominated the implementation of the NDP II. The participation of the private sector across MDAs and sectors was minimal yet Uganda pursued a private sector-led economy. Civil society continued to play its role as a watchdog over government and private sector performance. The participation of the private sector (and or CSOs) in procurement, contract negotiation, capacity building, technical evaluation of works and engaging the design agenda for the soft policy issues like disability responsive infrastructure and services remained minimal during the NDP 2 period.
276. Despite the existence of well elaborated and intentioned M & E structures, the monitoring and evaluation of the NDP II was biased towards public sector dominance that had very weak mechanisms to induce the private sector, NGOs and other non-state actors to monitor and evaluate Government policies, programmes and plans. The Civil Society Organizations remained reliant on donor funding which was not sustainable. The media continued to be a key player in development through promotion of civic awareness among the public that resulted in greater demand for information.
277. The reforms in NDP institutional monitoring and evaluation functions hinged on the Annual Review Forum, Sector Review Forum, Private Sector and Civil Society Forum and Local Government Review Forum were not operationalized. The forums would have provided platforms for stakeholder participation and collective action. The failure to undertake regular stakeholder reviews as had been intended under the proposed annual review forums, sector reviews, private sector and civil society reviews as well as local government reviews was a lost chance for such forums to improve the monitoring and evaluation processes of the NDP II that would have further popularised the Government interventions towards attainment of middle income status among the different stakeholders.
278. Under the NDP 2 period, the Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) only concentrated on Sub-County Barazas and ignored the Parish Barazas!. The NDPII Parish Barazas based on initiatives in the office of the Prime Minister to promote downward accountability were not regular. The non-functionality of Parish Barazas exposed a perilous institutional failure that undermined the participation of citizens and communities in the development process and provision of a platform for demanding social accountability. Public awareness through Parish Barazas proposed under NDP II was a missed opportunity for the communities to monitor and evaluate Government programmes and projects implemented in their areas.
279. Across sectors and or MDAs inadequate funding was the “financial cancer” irrespective of their categorisation as either “super MDAs (MoLG and LGs, OAG), centrality (OPM, MoFPED, NPA) and or coordination/oversight responsibilities (OP, OPM). In addition to

underfunding, Sector Working Groups (SWGs) and or Coordination Secretariats at line ministries struggled to overcome constraints such as limited capacity for coordination and or the lack of shared objectives to drive a sector approach and hence their high affinity to operate in silos.

280. Accounting Officers at Local Governments and Urban authorities asserted that LGs and Urban Authorities were inadequately funded to deliver adequate and quality decentralised services. There were also undertones of increased re-centralisation of authority by the Government that undermined the principles and values of decentralisation. The re-centralisation was in relation to: (i) Appointment of Accounting Officers, (ii) Local Revenue Management (Public Finance Management Act, 2005), local revenue was remitted to the Single Treasury Account and (iii) the National Building Planning Board limited the powers of LGs in physical planning since it could overturn or alter LGs decisions.

281. Government flagged irrigation infrastructure as one of its major interventions during the NDP 2. Irrigated land produced 40% of global food (IFAD, 2015). Uganda had one the highest irrigation potentials in the world with over 15% (37,000 sq. km out of the total area of 241,559 sq. km) of her surface area covered by fresh water resources. Uganda's ratio of cultivated area under irrigation to the irrigation potential was only 0.5% compared to 3.6% for Tanzania, 2.0% for Kenya and 1.6% for Burundi. There was a lack of streamlined extension structures to coordinate and provide advisory services and technical backstopping on irrigation to farmers from the local level to the national level. Irrigation did not make economic sense to most farmers because of low returns from farming. In addition, to physical water scarcity in times of need, in other areas farmers could not abstract the water and deliver it to their farms because of the high operation costs of conventional pumps that relied on fuel and or electricity. The land tenure systems in Uganda, especially customary tenure, was not clearly defined and it deterred farmers from making long-term investments on land (Wanyama et al, 2017).

282. The Education Act (2008) classified pre-school as a largely private undertaking which limited its access due to the relatively high fees and uneven distribution of Early Childhood Development (ECD) centres that was skewed towards urban areas or wealthy communities and central Uganda yet the earliest years of life provided children with the opportunity to grow to their full potential. All obstacles to the institutionalisation of ECD needed to be addressed to ensure equitable access to ECD.

283. During the FY 2019/20, in an attempt to increase access to higher education, the Higher Students Financing Board (HESFB) provided loans to 6,443 students for first and second semesters in various HEIs bringing the cumulative number of beneficiaries to 10,041 since the Board started its mandated activities. The lack of the standard unit cost for programmes across universities made it difficult for HESFB to make financial projections since the Board capped any loan to maximum of Ugx 7m per academic year. Relatedly, the HESFB did not fund higher degrees such as masters and doctorates.

284. In terms of human capital development for the tourism sub-sector, during the FY 2019/20 tourist and wildlife training institutes performed as follows: (i) 164 students (57%

female) enrolled at Uganda Hotel and Tourism Training Institute (UHTTI), Jinja and 228 (69% females) graduated and (ii) 162 (68 female) students enrolled at Uganda Wildlife Research and Training Institute (UWRTI), Kasese, and 72 graduated with Diplomas and Certificates. The enrolment and graduation figures were indicative of the low capacity of the institutes to produce the required human resources amidst undertones of being poorly equipped. The dominance of females in both the training institutes and the employment domain was implied. There were also undertones that foreigners at managerial levels dominated the hotel and tourism sub-sectors. A number of universities, however, offered a Bachelors of Tourism and Hotel Management, which provided room for academic progression and was a source for teaching and management staff for the sub-sectors.

285. The oil and gas legal regime in Uganda was weak compared to other countries like Liberia or Egypt, where all international agreements or investment contracts were effected only after parliamentary approval and or ratification. The Minister of Energy and Mineral Development negotiated and entered into petroleum agreements (Section 9 of the Upstream Act and Section 8 of the Midstream Act) and did not require parliamentary approval. There was no oversight role of Parliament during the negotiation and contracting process despite the existence of a National Resources Committee of Parliament.

286. Road transport was the most dominant mode carrying 96.5 % and 95 % of freight cargo and passenger traffic, respectively. As at 2019, the Country had a total road network of 159,364 km, which comprised of 20,854 km of National Roads; 38,603 km of District Roads; 19,959km of Urban Roads and 79,947 km of Community Access Roads. Overall, only 6,107km (3.83%) were paved and for district roads only 106.5 km (0.28%) were paved while for urban roads, 1229.7 km (6.16%) were paved. Development Partners investment and support was biased towards the construction area while the Railway, Water and Air transport sub-sectors were inadequately funded yet a Multi Model transport approach was the preferred model where all areas would be developed simultaneously. There was marvelous road development but less maintenance primarily funded by Government. The Development Partners continued to be concerned that long-standing policy issues such as adequate resources for road maintenance, progress on axle load controls and improved inter-modal transport planning that were continuously raised at annual review meetings had not been given due attention by the Government.

287. The success and coherence of the Health Policy Advisory Committee (HPAC) (SWG of the Health Sector) was attributed to the homogeneity of the sector and consistent support from the development partners. The effectiveness of the HPAC was demonstrated through efficiency in control of cross-border communicable diseases as well as epidemics such as Covid-19, Ebola and Marburg outbreaks. The institutional setup of the highhanded health-monitoring unit under State House, however, remained unclear within Government since the unit indulged in functions similar to those of the Quality Assurance Department within the Ministry of Health. In addition, the LGs found it difficult to attract medical doctors to far and hard to reach districts/areas. Amidst undertones against recentralisation of formerly decentralized services, it would be a noble decision to recentralise the appointment of

District Medical Officers (DMOs). The proliferation of LGs across the country constrained the role of inspection, monitoring and support supervision.

288. Relatedly, during the FY 2019/20, the health sector made significant strides towards achievement of key outcome indicators. Seventy seven percent of sub-counties had functional health centre III against the targeted 81%, immunization for the third dose for Diphtheria, Pertussis (Whooping Cough) and Tetanus (DPT) was 91% against the targeted 97%. Couple years of protection performed at 65% of the target of 4,700,000. However, a total of 57 HCIVs provided Caesarean Section (C/S) services without blood transfusion services!.
289. Trafficking in persons and poor welfare of migrant workers was a recurrent challenge for the social development sector. Some migrant workers often used informal channels to access employment abroad but sought Government interventions whenever they faced challenges. There were undertones that MoGLSD had not been decisive in handling the issue of labour migrants and due attention was required given the high youth and graduate-youth unemployment levels in Uganda. It was believed that poor implementation and compliance with the 2017 bilateral agreements with countries like Saudi Arabia that hosted more than 140, 000 Ugandan migrant workers who annually remitted about USD 900m to Uganda needed due attention. Relatedly, the labour structures of the LGs were not all filled and majority of the labour officers in the LGs were by assignment, which compromised the delivery of labour services in the LGs.
290. Public Administration was mandated to determine remuneration, public information management and sharing as well as results-based management (efficiency) of MDAs. The payment of a living wage started with Permanent Secretaries but had not been cascaded pro-rata resulting in discriminatory remunerations across sectors and worse still within the similar categories or functions like teaching at primary and secondary school levels. The failure by Government to curtail Members of Parliament from determining their remuneration and allowances remained a sticky matter during the NDP 2 period. Empirics were, however, not in line with the allegation that low remunerations across MDAs and LGs was a catalyst to corruption.
291. Proper use of public funds generally improved as evidenced by the substantial reduction in qualified opinions by the Auditor General. Of the 453 financial audits concluded by the Office of the Auditor General during the FY 2018/19, 420 (93%) entities had unqualified opinions while only 33 (7%) entities had qualified opinions.
292. There were divergences between appropriation by Parliament and final allocation by MoFPED, which was attributed to either to weaknesses in budget processes or frequent ad-hoc supplementary budget requests. Although it was argued that the budget supplementary requests were legal and were in line with the provision of the PMFA, 2015, they signalled to either poor planning or failure to accord due attention to the budgeting process. The terminal evaluation shared the displeasure of other stakeholders towards the institutionalised budget supplementary requests since they eroded the credibility of the

budget and that of the institutions mandated to execute it over the NDP II period. Supplementary budgets led to cuts in sector budgets, which negatively affected achievement of targets or fiscal deficit financing through domestic borrowing and printing as well as issuance of currency not backed by production.

293. With regard Justice Law and Order Sector, the wave of kidnaps and high profile murders during the FY 2018/19 needed thorough investigation. The average time taken to dispose cases reduced from 1,095 days to 810 days though it was remained short of the targeted 720 days. It was not clear whether that also applied to land cases or disputes. The sector faced a number of recurrent challenges. There were complaints about lost files and overstay in police cells and the sector struggled to mainstream the National Policy on Zero Tolerance to Corruption. The Uganda Police Force was consistent in all IG corruption perception surveys as one of the most corrupt institutions. Analogously, there was a tendency of institutionalized crime as manifested in increasing number of police officers that were in court for committing heinous crimes

6.2. Major Recommendations

294. Based on the major findings a number of recommendations were made. The implementation and M & E institutional frameworks became more complex as the NDPs progressed in numbers (NDP I, DNP II and or NDP III). Before additional implementation and M&E structures were suggested for subsequent NDPs deliberate efforts be directed towards addressing challenges that hindered the seamless functionality of the previous suggested structures to avoid over prescription. Specifically:

- a) The reforms in NDP institutional monitoring and evaluation functions hinged on the Annual Review Forum, Private Sector and Civil Society Forum as well as the Local Government Review Forum should be operationalized to enable seamless implementation, monitoring and evaluation of subsequent national development plans.
- b) Under the NDP 2 period, the Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) only concentrated on Sub-County Barazas and ignored the Parish Barazas!. The non-functionality of Parish Barazas exposed a perilous institutional failure that undermined the participation of citizens and communities in the development process and provision of a platform for demanding social accountability. It was recommended that both the Sub-County and Parish Barazas should be fully operationalized to serve their intended purposes for subsequent national development plans.
- c) The Delivery Unit under the OPM should be adequately funded, staffed and facilitated to function optimally and execute its coordination mandates for subsequent national development plans.

270. In terms of positioning NPA to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness, the MTR recommended to the effect that by placing NPA under direct supervision of the Presidency, NPA could gain a stronger clout over other MDAs and strategically provide technical capacity to cabinet on matters related to national development. The terminal evaluation did not find any major problem with the

current reporting mechanism and recommended that the status quo be maintained but NPA should be adequately funded and staffed to optimally function to execute its planning mandate.

271. Local Governments were tasked to deliver adequate and quality decentralised services because they were closer to the end users of development. The LGs had both technical staffing gaps as well as capacity issues that required urgent attention for to them fulfil their mandates in relation to delivering the NDP objectives. It was recommended that the MoLG and LGs should be funded adequately and capacity gaps bridged to enable LGS effectively and efficiently deliver their mandates under a strengthened decentralisation arrangement.

272. The Education Act (2008) classified pre-school as a largely private undertaking which limited its access due to the relatively high fees and uneven distribution of Early Childhood Development (ECD) centres that were skewed towards urban areas or wealthy communities and central Uganda yet the earliest years of life provided children with the opportunity to grow to their full potential. The Government should amend the relevant laws and institutionalize the provision of ECD to ensure equitable provision and enable children grow to their full potential.

273. During the FY 2019/20, in an attempt to increase access to higher education, the Higher Students Financing Board (HESFB) provided loans to 6,443 students for first and second semesters in various HEIs bringing the cumulative number of undergraduate beneficiaries to 10,041 but the board never funded graduate studies. The lack of the standard unit cost for programmes across universities made it difficult for HESFB to make financial projections since the Board capped any loan to maximum of Ugx 7m per academic year. It was recommended that capping be based on the highest scholarship year across programmes and across beneficiary higher education institutions to easy financial projections since payment is based on actuals. Relatedly, HESFB should seriously consider funding graduate studies and target universities with weak staff development to improve the quality of staff at such universities.

274. Road transport was the most dominant mode carrying 96.5 % and 95 % of freight cargo and passenger traffic, respectively. Due to the fact that road transport was the dominant of transport, the Government should increase the annual budget provisions for road maintenance to counter damages often caused by prolonged torrential rains and clear the ever increasing maintenance backlog as well as increase the mechanical imprest to match the maintenance needs for both national and district roads.

275. There were undertones (LG Stakeholders) that the MoLG had not strongly played its role of advocacy for the decentralisation principles and left it to the LG associations, which had to do it through the line Ministry. Relatedly, the LG Finance Commission, whose mandate was to advocate for finance of LGs, was unfortunately unfunded and could not optimally function. It was therefore recommended that the MoLG and its associated structures should purposely and decisively advocate for a strengthened decentralised mandate to achieve the noble objectives of decentralisation.

276. The terminal evaluation of the NDP II noted that the major institutional framework challenge of water for production was that the National Irrigation Policy, 2017 was silent about informal irrigation practices and made no provisions for its regulation. It was therefore necessary to find mechanisms of

regulating informal irrigation as opposed to the blanket suspension of agricultural activities from wetlands.

277. There were divergences between appropriation by Parliament and final allocation by MoFPED that was attributed to the institutionalised budget supplementary requests that eroded the credibility of the budget and that of the institutions mandated to execute it over the NDP II period. The terminal evaluation recommended that there was need for fiscal discipline since supplementary budgets led to cuts in sector budgets, which negatively affected achievement of sector targets.

Bibliography ~~List of References~~

- ACODE (2019)., Decentralisation, Trends, Achievements and the way-forward for local governments in Uganda: Conference Report Summary, Kampala. ACODE, Policy Dialogue Report Series No.33.
- Barma, N. H., K. Kaiser, T.M. Le and L. Vinuela (2012), Rents to Riches? The Political Economy of Natural Resource-led Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Retrieved from: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/545221468150583397/Rents-to-riches-The-politiceconomy-of-natural-resource-led-development>
- Cameron, P,D, and Stanley, M,C., (2017).,Oil, Gas, and Mining. A Source Book for Understanding the Extractive Industries.
- FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). (2015). “FAO’s information system on water and agriculture.” Rome.Golombok, R., and M.L. Jones (2015), Oil Governance in Uganda and Kenya: A Review of Efforts to Establish Baseline Indicators on the Impact of the Oil Sector in Uganda and Kenya. Nairobi: UNEP.
- Government of Uganda. (2009). Promotion of cotton production and facilitation of value addition to Ugandas cotton by Cotton Development Organisation. Office of the Auditor General, Kampala, Uganda.
- Mbabazi,P and Muhangi,M, (...),Uganda’s Oil Governance Institutions: Fit for Purpose? In Oil Wealth and Development in Uganda and Beyond: Prospects, Opportunities, and Challenges.
- Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD) (2017), Ministerial Policy Statements. Retrieved from: www.energyandminerals.go.ug.
- Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2011). Public-Private Partnership Framework Policy. General Notice No. of 2011.
- Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2017). National strategy for Private sector Development 2017.
- (2020a). Roads Sub-Sector Annual Budget Monitoring Report FY 2019/20.
-(2020b). Health Sector Annual Budget Monitoring Report FY 2019/20.
-(2020c). Education and Sports Sector Annual Budget Monitoring Report FY 2019/20.
-(2020d). Energy and Mineral Development Sector Annual Budget Monitoring Report FY 2019/20.
-(2020e). Information and Communication Technology Sector Annual Budget Monitoring Report FY 2019/20
-(2020f). Agriculture Sector Annual Budget Monitoring Report FY 2019/20.
- Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities (2018). Ministry Policy Statement. FY 2021/2022.
- NITA-U (2020). Statistical Abstract
- Ministry of Water and Environment (2022).Terms of Reference for the Development of off-farm infrastructure management model and its establishment for Kabuyanda Irrigation Scheme in Isingiro District
- Parliament of Uganda (2016), The Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Natural Resources for the 2016/17. Kampala: Government of Uganda.
- Patey, L. (2015), ‘Oil in Uganda: Hard Bargaining and Complex Politics in East Africa’, OIES Working Paper 660. Retrieved from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies website: <https://doi.org/10.26889/9781784670405>.
- Schubert, S.R. (2006), ‘Revisiting the Oil Curse: Are Oil Rich Nations Really Doomed to Autocracy and Inequality?’, [2006] Oil and Gas Business 1. Retrieved from: <http://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10109/>.
- Tumwesigye.,R., Twebaze., P., Makuregye.,N, Muyambi, E. (2011). Key issues in Uganda’s energy sector: Pro-Biodiversity Conservationists in Uganda (PROBICOU).
- UBoS (2017), 2017 Statistical Abstract, Uganda Bureau of Statisitcs, Kampala, Uganda.
- Watkins, E. (2010), Uganda’s President Wants Final Approval of All Oil, Gas Deals’, The Oil and Gas Journal, 108(32),25–27.Retrievedfrom:<https://www.ogj.com/general-interest/government/article/17282811/ugandas-president-wants-final-approval-of-all-oil-gas-deals>.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Summary of the roles and responsibilities of the NDP II Implementation, MandE Institutions

Institutions	Implementation and Coordination Roles	M and E Roles and Responsibilities
Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Take overall leadership and oversight of implementation of the plan to ensure its attainment. (ii) Pursue zero tolerance to corruption; (iii) Timely communication of cabinet decisions (iv) Fast-track implementation of directives from H.E The President; (v) Mobilizing the population towards achievement of the plan; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Take overall leadership and oversight of the Plan to ensure attainment of national goals; (ii) Convene the NDP Annual Review Forum; (iii) Conduct policy dialogues for effective service delivery (iv) Facilitating community participation in accountability efforts through LG forums; (v) Conducting independent reviews on the performance of key Government policies, programs and projects; (vi) Mobilizing and sensitizing the population through electronic and print media to own national development goals and empower them to give feedback on performance; (vii) Monitor the performance of the manifesto commitments for the ruling Party; (viii) Undertake oversight monitoring on performance of Government projects, programs, policies and the entire economy
Cabinet	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Provide policy direction for NDP II; (ii) Approve the budget allocations; (iii) Champion the implementation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Review and assess efficiency and effectiveness of policies, programmes and interventions (ii) Review the performance of implementation of plans and (other emergency interventions) (iii) Review and monitor the performance of the entire economy of Uganda (iv) Monitor governance issues of the country
Parliament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Ensure that the National budget is aligned to the NDP priorities; (ii) Oversee the implementation of NDPII; (iii) Enact enabling legislation; (iv) Actively represent views of the public in implementation of NDP II. (v) Appropriate resources for NDP 2 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Conduct oversight over implementation of Government policies, programmes and the performance of MDAs and the economy as a whole (ii) Undertake field oversight monitoring and present reports for corrective action

Institutions	Implementation and Coordination Roles	M and E Roles and Responsibilities
	Implementation; (vi) Approve Government loans and grants; (vii) Hold the Executive accountable on implementation.	(iii) Assess alignment of budgets, policies and programmes to the country's strategic direction/goals, in line with the planning framework (Uganda Vision 2040 and the NDP). (iv) Review accountabilities with the view to assess effectiveness and impact of policies and programmes
National Planning Authority	(i) Develop the National Development Plans; (ii) Align long term, medium term and annual budget allocations to the NDP priorities; (iii) Report to Cabinet and Parliament on the progress of implementation of the Plan; (iv) Issue Certificate of Compliance of the national budget for the previous year, Sector, MDA and LG Plans and Budgets; (v) Coordinate implementation planning of the PIP (Project Preparation and Appraisal); (vi) Issue Planning Call Circulars to Sectors, MDAs and LGs; (vii) Assist sectors to develop Service and Service Delivery Standards (viii) Develop NDP II performance indicators and targets in liaison with sectors; (ix) Overall responsibility for the NDPII Results Framework (impact, outcome and output indicators).	(i) Take leadership in monitoring and evaluation of implementation of medium term and long term National Development goals and Plans; (ii) Report on the outcome and impact results of the Plan; (iii) Coordinate NDPII M and E forums at all levels; (iv) Establish and maintain an integrated M and E system based on the NDPII results framework; (v) Ensure that the budget outcomes and outputs are aligned to the NDPII; (vi) Undertake pre-investment evaluation of projects and programmes (vii) Undertake reviews, ex-post evaluation and impact assessment of Government Plans, projects, programmes and policies; (viii) Undertake assessment of the performance of sectors, ministries and local governments in relation to the implementation of the national development plan; (ix) Assess performance of the entire economy of Uganda.
Office of Prime minister	(i) Coordinate implementation of the Plan; (ii) Channel for the flow of public sector performance information and reports (iii) Submit periodic reports on coordination of implementation of the NDP to Cabinet; (iv) Ensure effective and timely implementation of decisions from Cabinet and hold MDAs accountable; (v) Strengthen functioning of the Sector-Wide Approach; (vi) Operationalize the Delivery Unit framework;	(i) Undertake performance monitoring and produce annual and semi-annual reports to Cabinet on Government performance. (ii) Receive and analyse quarterly performance reports from MDAs and LGs and provide feedback. (iii) Timely assessment, feedback and follow up of GAPR recommendations with implementing agencies. (iv) Monitor adherence to standards during implementation across sectors (v) Monitor M and E capacity building programmes among MDAs
Ministry of	(i) Resource mobilization and allocation;	(i) Resource mobilization and timely

Institutions	Implementation and Coordination Roles	M and E Roles and Responsibilities
Finance Planning and Economic Development.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (ii) Timely release of funds for implementation of the NDP; (iii) Ensure accountability for resources disbursed; (iv) Ensure efficient and effective procurement systems; (v) Ensure direct linkage between planning, budgeting and resource allocation during budgeting and implementation; (vi) Facilitate effective PPP arrangements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> release of funds for M and E across Government (ii) Ensure timely accountability for resources disbursed. (iii) Monitor the performance of the budget in line with the national development. (iv) Monitor public debt (v) Assess sustainability and impact of the public debt in relation to medium term and long term planning (vi) Monitor foreign assistance (Aid), including off-budget support
Ministry of Public Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Clearly define the roles and responsibilities of MDAs/LGs to eliminate duplication of roles/efforts; (ii) Enforce and implement performance assessment instruments for Public Servants; (iii) Provide and implement the pay policy; (iv) Provide and implement policy framework for HR Capacity building for the Public service; (v) Provide a policy framework and ensure proper implementation of HR procedures, policies, practices and systems; (vi) Provide standards and systems for managing and administering the Public Service; (vii) Coordinate joint inspection programs on Public service delivery; (viii) Provide and monitor the reward and sanctions framework. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Monitor and evaluate performance of the Public Service (ii) Monitor the remuneration, rewards and sanctions framework (iii) Monitor the implementation of capacity building initiatives across Government (iv) Monitor the implementation of approved structures and systems for service delivery (v) Monitor compliance to established service standards in managing and administering the Public Services
Ministry of Local Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Coordinate implementation of the NDPII at LG level; (ii) Support LGs to mainstream NDPII priorities into LG Development Plans; (iii) Support capacity building for NDPII implementation in Local; (iv) Governments in collaboration with MOPS; (v) Advise on funding modalities for the LGs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Monitor the performance of the LG level results framework (ii) Monitor and evaluate capacity building interventions at Local Government level (iii) Receive and analyse quarterly performance reports from LGs and provide (iv) feedback to LGs and key stakeholders (v) Convene NDP forums at LG level in collaboration with NPA and follow-up recommendations. (vi) Monitor and evaluate the on-budget and off-budget financing arrangements at LG level

Institutions	Implementation and Coordination Roles	M and E Roles and Responsibilities
Sectors/ other Ministries, departments and agencies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Effectively implement plans in line with the sector set targets and Performance indicators; (ii) Provide timely accountability for allocated resources and results; (iii) Provide planning and implementation guidelines to LGs; (iv) Provide technical support supervision to LGs; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Monitor the implementation of sector development plans (SDPs) and strategic plans (ii) Monitor and submit to OPM and NPA reports on performance against set targets/indicators (iii) Monitor and submit reports to OPM and NPA on implementation of sector projects and programmes
Local Governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (iv) Implement the District Development Plans; (v) Support the implementation of national projects and programs; (vi) Mobilize local revenue to finance LG priorities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (vii) Monitor implementation of District Development Plans (viii) Monitor and submit reports on implementation of projects and programs in Districts. (ix) Monitor and submit reports to MoLG on local revenue mobilization within the districts.
Non-State Actors (Development partners, CSOs, Media, Academia, private sector)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Partner with government through PPPs, and through other development interventions for effective implementation of NDP in line with set priorities; (ii) Partner with Government through bi- and multilateral partnerships, PPPs and other development interventions for effective implementation of NDPII in line with set priorities; (iii) Align partnership strategies to the NDPII and sector strategies and promote the use of government systems and procedures; (iv) Improve policies and procedures in order to increase the impact of development partnerships on the intended results of the NDPII, including promotion of human rights and rule of law; (v) Promote accountability to Government and the citizens of Uganda in the use of development resources; (vi) Reduce transaction costs and promote value for money; (vii) Assist Government through financial, technical and other forms of assistance to ensure effective implementation of the NDPII. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Monitor and submit reports on implementation of their projects and programs to respective LGs and sectors. (ii) Assess and provide over sight reports on service delivery and implementation of planning in the country (iii) Participate in sector and Local Government reviews (iv) Participate in the public sector planning processes at LGs and at sector level. (v) Provide timely and quality data on the financial and physical implementation of the project for which they are executing agency to the relevant MDAs and LGs. (vi) Participate in the discussion and decision making committees at program ,sector and national level that review and comment on the public sector performance (vii) Assist Government through financial and technical and other forms of assistance to strengthen its performance.

Source: NPA 2015, *NDPII Implementation Strategy for the Second 2nd National Development Plan (2015/16 – 2019/20)* pg22/24 and NPA 2015; *Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy for the 2nd National Development Plan (2015/16-2019/20)* pg. 267.

